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The following splendid oration treats mainly of *post bellum* history; but this is a period of great importance as exhibiting the fruits of the doctrines of the Federal war-party. The distinguished orator has given a picture of the violation of the peace of '65, and the war upon the Constitution made by the Radical party, which should be widely read, and most carefully preserved as material for the future historian.

Address of General John T. Morgan, U. S. Senator from Alabama.

The efforts of the Southern Historical Society have been most appropriately directed to the collection of facts relating to the period of actual and open war from 1861 to 1865.

That field is yet but slightly gleaned, and it is indispensable that this generation of Southern men should gather all its sad truths and preserve them until a later period, when, in a cloudless atmosphere, the patient and impartial philosopher shall be able to place facts and deductions side by side, and do justice to the people of the Confederacy.

In the future our historical records will probably abound with success and prosperity, which the world takes for the measure of high qualities and great deservings, and we shall not then need that any should vindicate us.

It is our duty, also, to consider well the turning point in our destiny which we have just past, so that the future—that now is dawning so auspiciously—shall not become darker than the past, through a mistake of the facts or principles on which our hopes are rested. The present is, perhaps, the most important period of our history. I have selected the events now occurring as the truest interpreters of the past, as they seem to furnish also the most certain indications of the future of our country.

The causes that have made it necessary to compile a separate history of the Southern States had their origin in differences of opinion reaching back to 1787. These differences seem to have ended in 1877. They were always political—relating to constructions of the Constitution as applied to different measures that have been proposed. They never resulted from natural causes, such as give rise to the quarrels of different nations or races of men, except so far as they related to African slavery. They only became sectional when the measures which excited the discussion happened to affect a particular section of the country. In 1812 to 1815 some of the States of the North strongly threatened to secede from the Union, which then implied a desire to return to their former allegiance to the British Crown. In 1830 to 1832 there was manifested an almost fatal purpose in some of the States to assert the right to remain in the Union and set at defiance some of the laws which, though constitutional in form, were alleged to be locally oppressive.

In 1861, the question of slavery furnished the occasion or provocation under which this ancient quarrel culminated in open war. While the question thus presented involved great political issues, it also included the dangerous element of race antagonism and race supremacy, and involved the accumulated wealth of two centuries invested by the South in slave property. It is scarcely conceivable that any free Government could have afforded a peaceful solution of such a question. Until the strife of contention over the powers and principles of our Federal Government connected itself with this question and threatened the extermination of slavery, there had been no occasion of sufficient magnitude to demand its solution with war. That question was local and sectional. It had hold of every sentiment and interest and prejudice, and involved every ground of former differences of opinion as to the construction of the Constitution that could excite, arouse, and make desperate the contending parties.

The absolute right of home rule as to slavery, in its ownership and control, was alleged by one party. The other party—the Abolitionists—denied this right, claiming that a law higher than the Constitution condemned slavery and everything that upheld it.

In the excitement of this controversy, and because of the political power this party embodied, others who denied the political propositions on which the Abolition party was based followed its lead, believing that it was safer to violate the Constitution than to lose power, and hoping that the expurgation of slavery from the country would condone their delinquency. They followed the lead of the Abolitionists, denying even their purpose to abolish slavery until after it was destroyed, and then they avowed it.

Their denials were merely protests against the doctrines of the "higher law" party. They really desired that slavery should be extirpated, but

could not admit that the Federal power reached the subject even in States that were in rebellion, as they saw fit to designate the Southern States. Still they kept in line with the dominant and aggressive power, and contented themselves with gentle protests against the destruction of the States. The old question, which in fact led to the war—the question of the right of local self-government in the States, which was the substantial political issue between the Abolitionists and the States of the South—was for a time silenced in the tempest of war. It slept until slavery was destroyed, and then arose again, when it was attempted to destroy the States.

Thousands of men engaged in the destruction of slavery, and, having that for the purpose of every blow they struck, were assisted by tens of thousands who fought to save the Union of the States, leaving the question of the rights and powers of the State and Federal governments, which led the South to secession, undecided by the results of the war. All these are free now as they were before the war to assert or to deny that the States have still the right of local self-government, and some of them deny it, while others admit the right. It may be safely said, in 1877, that this question will never again result in war. It has become impossible to excite the country to war upon sectional divisions, because there remain no questions of material interest upon which they can divide by lines of latitude or longitude. All sectional controversies being removed from the domain of discussion, whatever affects one State in like manner affects all the States. If one is wounded in its rights, all suffer alike, if not equally. The turning point in the destiny of the South that has been reached in 1877 is the final practical restoration to the States of the right of local self-government. It was for this that the people of the South fought in 1861; for this they suffered ten years of terrible persecution, from 1867 to 1877; and it is with this right firmly secured that they are content.

This is the end of a period of trials and suffering in which we have been exposed to the danger of the total subversion of our State governments, and with them to the loss of all substantial guaranties of our personal rights and liberties.

It is the beginning of an era of peace, which is the result of the failure of a pernicious effort to subordinate the States to the absolute will of Congress.

The political forces that have so long acted with repressive power upon the States have ceased, and they rise again with restorative and compensatory energy to their former dignity and influence.

In this year those institutions of government which we have been so proud to call American reached their lowest depression in the respect of mankind; and with quick and safe reaction they have regained their lost

ground and have become a pattern for the nations of the earth. Our people of all sections and all parties have shown that they are fully capable of exercising with wisdom and prudence the vast powers which reside in them under our free system of government, so that the most violent storms of popular excitement shall not destroy it, or defeat the ultimate power of the law.

When forty millions of people, with ten millions of voters, raise themselves above the atmosphere of hot and bitter recrimination engendered by a terrible civil war, and, forgetting party ties and prejudices, and overlooking insults and injuries which affect their keenest sensibilities, declare for the Constitution as the inviolable rule of government in all public administration and as the security of every private right, the world may again confidently believe that all enlightened races are capable of self-government.

Until 1867 it was supposed that it was impossible that there could be evolved through our political system a greater or more disastrous evil than our great civil war. But this opinion has been disproved by subsequent events.

When that war closed faith and confidence between the real belligerents was immediately restored, so that the soldiers of the Confederacy were disbanded on the field of battle and discharged from every restraint that did not apply to every citizen of the United States. But one right, which had been the subject of controversy before and during the war, was destroyed—the right of property in slaves. This was not destroyed by actual agreement, but was left to a tacit understanding, which was afterwards confirmed by the formal consent of the Southern States and people, acting as a free people, under the forms of law and through solemn constitutional ordinances. In this action several of the States even anticipated the propositions of Congress to add the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This is all that we yielded. Of course the Government of the Confederate States perished in the war, but the government of the States that composed the Confederation remained as if the war had never been waged, as to their rights and powers of home-rule.

It was not through the magnanimity of the Federal Government that the Southern States were restored to these rights and powers. This is a common but most mistaken view of the matter. The United States Government has always held that we could neither forfeit nor abandon the rights and duties of the States—that ours is an imperishable union of indestructible States. It was the only avowed purpose of the war to restore the seceding States to the Union. This could not be done by destroying their autonomy as States of the Union—States like the others, and with equal powers and privileges. There can be no conquered States



*Memorandum*

*Address of General John T. Morgan.*

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in the American Union. When conquered they become provinces. If we had come back by compulsion as conquered States, the Union of States could not have been restored. It was a result of the war, as binding on the Federal Government as on the seceding States, that when they returned to the Union they should come back to the same position they had attempted to resign.

When this result was achieved, and the Union was re-established by war, and was found to be perfect in every respect, as it had been before the war, without a State missing or destroyed, or impaired in its rights, a great pledge was maintained, a great victory had been gained. A restoration had been accomplished which aroused the triumphant enthusiasm of those who believed that they had saved the Union, and left a lighter burden of regret upon the hearts of the vanquished. The States came forth from the hideous night of civil war, as the stars appear after the storms have swept the heavens.

The admiration of the civilized nations of the world was excited to the highest degree at the inherent power and indestructibility of our free constitutional Government. When it was rent with the secession of nearly half of its entire territory, strained to the uttermost in every possible resource, with more dead and wounded fallen from the ranks of its armies than the entire number of its armed foes, the monarchical powers recalled a jeering prophecy of a hundred years ago. But when peace was restored, and they saw it readjusting the nice and delicate relations between States and people, so that not a flaw or blemish or imperfection was discernible, not a scar was seen on the body politic, they felt that their prophecy had been unjust towards the millions of our race, who have for so many centuries aspired to the blessings of liberty regulated by constitutional law. And when they saw it at last rising proudly from the struggle, strengthened by its trials and ennobled and purified by its efforts to preserve its organism in the exact form and proportions in which our fathers had given it to the people, they realized a fact, that was not too dearly established even through the horrors of civil war, that constitutional liberty based on the sovereignty of the people, is a stronger and more enduring power than any royal dynasty, or any form of monarchical government.

Those who were vanquished had always believed that this form of government was the best. When they separated from the other States they adopted the Constitution of the United States, without any essential change of its form or principles, as their plan of government.

Although they had seceded from the Union they proved, by their adoption of this form of government, that their quarrel had not been with the Constitution or the form of our Government, but with a system of constructions which they believed were subversive of them. Measures had

been enacted and others had been forecast in the final decrees of the ballot-box, which the Southern people believed to be wholly unjust and unconstitutional.

When these measures were carried by force of arms, and had become by tacit or express recognition the law of the land, and when the States of the South were again restored to the Union, the people still believed that the old Constitution, as it was at the close of the war, was fully adequate to the protection of every remaining right.

This was an honest and hearty belief. They realized the fact that slavery had met its fated hour in the united judgment of the civilized nations of the white race, and that it was necessary and even better to yield it.

They felt that they could not afford to remain in relations with the white people of the earth which involved their censure, however unmerited, and kept them always embroiled, even with their kindred in their own country, in defending their rights.

They returned with alacrity, and not with the sullen reluctance of a conquered people, to their allegiance to a restored constitutional Union.

The Constitution remained in its full unbroken efficiency to protect every right except that one which had perished in the conflict of arms. So the matter was received and understood by the people of the South.

After they had done all that required by duty and honor to defend the right which they at last yielded; when they felt that greater sacrifices were not required for that cause, even though it involved more than half of all their property, their reunion with the States of the North, under the flag and Constitution of a common country, was a grateful result to them.

For a period of nearly three years the peace of 1865 remained almost unbroken. So far as the South was concerned, it was kept in good faith. They considered it as a real and faithful peace.

It is true that unconstitutional taxes were levied upon their productions; confiscators and plunderers took their property by force, and after having consumed the greater part in their charges for the robbery, paid the residue into the United States treasury, where it has been set aside by subsequent laws as a conscience fund.

Many wrongs that sorely tried the people were inflicted upon them merely because they were powerless; but these things did not drive them from the line of duty. They kept faith with the entire country; they kept peace within their own borders; they respected, obeyed, and enforced the laws; they amended their constitutions so as to make them conform to the results of the war; and a prosperity attended their labors which proved that no calamity and no misrule could deprive the beautiful land of the South of its sceptre as the queen of the commerce of this hemisphere.

But this peace was afterwards rudely and unnecessarily broken through the wicked ambition of men who had no honorable agency in the great war, and great capitulation, which had resulted in peace in 1865.

In 1867 Congress broke the treaty made by the armies at the surrender, without just cause or reasonable excuse.

The peace of 1865 was not made by treaty between belligerent nations. The Confederate States Government was destroyed. It was not made between the States because, under the Constitution they could not be recognized individually, and as to each other, as belligerents, or in any respect as powers foreign to the Government of the United States.

The treaty, if it may be called such, was made by terms of capitulation between the two armies in the field, and was ratified in the parole of every Confederate soldier. Thus the most sacred of all the engagements of public faith was made a matter of personal agreement between the Government of the United States and the soldiers of the Confederacy. When General Lee and General Johnston surrendered their armies they did not consent to impose upon them conditions of civil inferiority when they should return to their homes. They would never have surrendered upon such terms.

Never was the honor of a country more bound up in any treaty, and never was public faith more unjustly disregarded, than it was when the government that received these paroles afterwards disregarded them.

The Congress of the United States, under its power to make war, and with the army under its control—made subject to its command by a flagrant invasion of the prerogatives of the President—resumed hostilities against the people of the States that had been engaged in the war of 1861.

The President refused to give the sanction of his authority to this unjust war, and his powers as Commander-in-Chief were virtually usurped by a joint committee of the two Houses that commanded Generals who undertook to command the President.

While the President was extending the pardoning power to the relief of almost every person in the South from all the consequences of the alleged rebellion of 1861, Congress was engaged in a new declaration of war based upon these pardoned offences.

The war of 1861 had been a war of restoration of the Union and of the supremacy of the Federal laws. The war of 1867 was waged for conquest, subjugation, and spoils.

Congress was enraged that the President, by his free use of the pardoning power and his recognition of the rights of the States, should impede the work of the reconstruction of the States by military coercion.

The President was impeached because he chose to follow the Constitution rather than obey the behest of a party that derided its injunctions and spurned its authority.

The history of this country was only saved from the foulest disgrace that ever threatened a nation by the heroic moral courage of a few great spirits, who periled all—and, for a season, appeared to have lost everything—to prevent such a calamity.

It is a pleasing and grateful duty to render honor to the purity and courage of these saviours of the country, who voted down the articles of impeachment.

Do I pass the boundaries of actual legal and historic truth in defining the reconstruction of the States in 1867–8, and the enforcement of the measures and policy of this movement down to 1877, as being a state of war maintained by acts of warfare?

There was no rebellion, insurrection, or domestic violence in any of the Southern States to require the President to send armies into them.

No requisition for such forces were made either by the Governors or the Legislatures of any of these States.

The forces of the United States that remained in the Southern States were not in any way disturbed, or molested, or threatened by the States or the people. No war was made upon the Federal armies in the South.

Notwithstanding this state of entire pacification, and that there was no disputed authority as between contending claimants for power or office in any of the States, and no quarrel with the Federal Government, the States were, by military orders, grouped into military districts and placed under the command of officers of the army of the United States.

These military commandants, having no more rightful power than they have now, took command in every department of civil and military law, and ruled without responsibility over everything and everybody.

Their armies were stationed at strategic points to sustain their authority. At their own will and pleasure they removed the officers lawfully chosen in each of these States from their offices, from the highest to the lowest grades, and in every department of the several States; and in their places installed their own appointees.

The highest exercise of autocratic power never exceeded the reach of their authority. The President could not exercise over the menials of his household a more absolute and irresponsible power than those satraps (the word is the only one that is historically a true definition of the office) exerted over governors, legislatures, judges, and magistrates, and all in authority in the States.

Resistance to such authority was met only by force. No court or judicial power, not even a court-martial was required to give its judicial sanction to the order, or to aid in its execution.

Arms in the hands of the soldiery were the forces which executed the decrees that were flashed upon the eyes of a helpless people from the swords of their masters.

They had the power to arrest without warrant or complaint; to imprison without a hearing; to deny the writ of *habeas corpus*; to release without trial such as were accused of crime; and to seize and confiscate estates without asking the aid of a court of justice.

Such governments were called military governments; but what shall we call that condition of public affairs in which such a government is sustained within and over a State—nay, three or more States—of the American Union, grouped under the sword of one satrap, like slaves bound to a single chain. If it was not a state of war, what was it?

In Russia or Persia this might aptly be called a state of siege, but our Constitution has not provided for a state of siege against the sovereign parties to the Union.

It has gone no further than to permit the law-making power of the land to enable the Executive, on certain conditions, to deny to individuals the writ of *habeas corpus*.

Provinces may be outlawed in despotic governments, but States in the American Union cannot be coerced except by actual war. In our Constitution the civil power is placed above the military. When this organic law is reversed, so that the military power becomes the law-making and the ruling power, then war exists.

The Constitution provides the means by which the military power may be called in to aid in upholding the civil power, but none through which it may supplant the latter, except in actual war.

The only difficulty in defining the period of the reconstruction of the Southern States as a time of actual war is that the United States Government, or, more properly, Congress was the only belligerent party. The other parties were helpless citizens and soldiers who were disarmed and held under paroles. They could not resist; they could only suffer wrong. They were like prison-ships anchored within range of the guns of a beleaguered fortress to receive the fire of their friends if they should attempt to resist the invader.

The friends of the Constitution did not dare to array themselves against this military usurpation, lest they should destroy the States that were doomed to suffer its aggressions and wrongs.

The whole country felt that it was at war. It is not true that this was a period in which peace was prevented only by the angry passions and lingering resentment of the people.

Peace had come; the dove had found a footing in the land and it was a welcome visitor. But new hostilities were begun, and for new causes; the chief of which was that the helpless condition of the South invited

a hoard of plunderers to the assault, under a cry for the reconstruction of the States, after the restoration of the Union had been completed.

It was not a state of war maintained, after the conclusion of actual hostilities in 1865, as a means of adjusting finally the results of that struggle.

It was a war begun after each of the belligerent States had resumed its normal relations to the other States; after they had conducted civil government for nearly three years as States of the Union, and under and in accordance with the Constitution.

These States had abolished slavery; had accepted and ratified an amendment to the Federal Constitution submitted to them by a vote of Congress; had remodeled their own constitutions so as to conform them to the results of the war; had paid taxes; had been recognized as States by every other State in the Union, and by the President, and by the Supreme Court; had elected Representatives in Congress; and had performed every office and duty, both Federal and local, which in any way appertained to them.

It was in this condition that they were found when the armies of reconstruction invaded them, overthrew the civil law, and supplanted the civil power with the military by force of arms.

Not only were these States at peace, but they were so helpless in every military sense, that they could not even threaten the peace of the country.

Then began the nine years war of reconstruction, that was separated from the four years war of restoration by nearly three years of peace. A peace which was only interrupted by the complainings of the people, mingled with the beastly exultations of the plunderers—as the great and silent deserts are sometimes awakened in the night by the cries of the jackalls mingled with the plaintive calls of their victims that have wandered from the caravans.

It is true that in the South, as in the North, there was a strong sense of antagonism and resentment between the people after the war, but it was less aggravated from 1865 to 1867, than it was from thence to 1877. The war of reconstruction was a dishonorable oppression for an unworthy cause; and it was condemned accordingly in the hearts of good men of all sections. I will not say that none of its advocates thought it necessary or just. Those who advocated the higher law prior to 1861, and forced the shedding of blood to meet that heresy, probably felt that it was just, or even generous, to employ the army again rather than the halter to secure the destruction of the State Governments, which had always been offering obstruction to the realization of their radical schemes. But those who fought to preserve the Union and not to destroy the States have, for the ten years past, been cast down with shame and grief because

the condition of the country had made it possible that such a war could be waged for such a cause and against a people so helpless and unoffending.

The real purpose of the war of 1867 was to secure a presidential election. The immobility of President Johnson, like a rock in the sea, had caused a reactionary movement among the people to save the Constitution as well as the Union.

Those who wanted the Union without the Constitution—who wanted an oligarchy instead of a republic—at once discerned that nothing but a state of war in the South could justify the exercise of the power necessary to stop the reflux tide which the resistance of the President had set in motion; and so they levied war against the State governments, and marshalled an army to enforce the movement.

It was the right of local self-government in the States that stood in the way of the marplots who intended to control the presidency at every hazard. The encounter with Andrew Johnson caused them to dread a President who regarded his oath to support the Constitution, and they intended that nothing should be left to chance in the election of his successor. This purpose could only be accomplished by taking the government of the Southern States out of the hands of the people, and that could only be accomplished by war. The power to make war was the only power possessed by Congress that could touch the States in this vital point.

The war of reconstruction was waged to secure the permanent ascendancy of a political party. If the Southern States had been Republican instead of Democratic in their party associations, this war would have been spared us, and the country would have escaped a lasting disgrace.

No Democrat, North or South, engaged in this war except as he was drawn beneath the chariot wheels as a bloody victim of its cruelties.

Not all the Republicans engaged in this war. Many of those who had fought for the flag and the Union did not desire to see the proud ensign of the country floating over States that were enslaved, and a Union of States that included eleven members that were so enthralled that they could not, in any way, act without the permission of the army.

Congress at first raised this issue with the Southern States by refusing to them representation in either house. They did not neglect, however, to tax the people to whom they refused representation.

It soon became apparent that the rights and powers of home rule comprised nearly everything valuable in government, so far as it related to the personal welfare of the masses of the people. They did not repine at the neglect of Congress, or even at its aversion towards them.

At the end of three years the ostracised States had fully established the fact that their people could live and prosper for a century without



feeling the want of representation in Congress. They could have the protection of the flag of the Union such as the Territories enjoyed; they were entitled to exemption from taxation as the Indians are, because they had no representation in Congress; they had the sympathy and respect of their sister States, and could trust to their interested guardianship of the equal rights of all the States. What more could they really need, besides the power of local self-government, to make their people safe and prosperous?

Such a condition would not, of course, meet the demands of a great and proud people, but it would be preferable to that low condition in which a despised minority should be compelled to submit to insult and injustice continually at the hands of those in power.

It was this demonstration of the great fact that the States are the real repositories of the essential powers of the Federal Government in money, in men, and in military resources, in the election of Presidents and Representatives in Congress in both Houses; and that, by withholding these things, the States can at any moment paralyze the Federal Government; that alarmed the higher law people, and they struck home, at the root of the tree, when they, in the war of reconstruction, struck at the great rights of home rule. The struggle for these rights has been long and painful. We could only meet military force with patient suffering. In the beginning, a vast number of men in the South were disfranchised who had given long and attentive study to our peculiar and nicely-adjusted system of government. In their places, those were put who were in no sense qualified for free and independent suffrage, to say nothing of the intelligent exercise of this important privilege.

Then came military intimidation, arrests, imprisonments, the espionage of brutal spies and detectives in the private and sacred sanctuaries of home. Then hired "traitors to the blood that coursed in their veins" were licensed, by nominal elections to office, to steal and plunder at will. But no one pen will ever enumerate these crimes, and no tongue will ever be able to portray them in their horrid enormity.

This struggle has ended, I believe, forever. The revolution of 1867 has at last failed of its purpose; ballot after ballot has expressed the decree of the popular will against the revolution; there seems to be no remaining cause which can lead to a renewal of the struggle, and it is ended. In this struggle the people of the South have won a great moral victory. It was the cherished and abiding hope of the peace-breakers that we should be goaded into armed resistance. They sought this occasion against us to destroy us. Our friends in the North, who witnessed with the deepest concern the whole movement, stood close at our sides and bade us be still and to quietly endure every persecution until a recurring sense of justice amongst the people should deprive the destructives of power.

Faithfully and honestly they stood by us in every trial, and under the influence of their counsels and example we took courage and resolved to outlive the revolution, and finally to vote it down. This we have done.

We of the South, in concert with the people of the North and West, elected a statesman to the Presidency who was pledged to put an end to this war against the States.

His opponent, who became President, had declared his opinions in favor of the principles on which the Southern States have so long stood united, but it was supposed by some who supported him that those declarations were only meant to deceive. They did not rightly appreciate him. They were true words from an honest heart, uttered in harmony with the expressed will of the people, and maintained in acts which prove that his conscience is alert and guides him in an earnest effort to support and obey the Constitution of the United States. How insignificant the prospect that those who have so greatly harmed the country through the evil times of the war of reconstruction will ever be able to undo the work now completely finished.

The two statesmen who opposed each other for the Presidency agree that the States must be left to govern themselves, in all matters of home rule, without civil or military interference by Congress. Their followers sustain them, and the covenant of peace is sealed by the authentic act of both the great political parties of the country.

The States have regained the dignity with which they clothed themselves, and the immortal honors with which they were crowned by the nations of the earth when, after having achieved their independence, the thirteen States were each received into the circle of the great ruling powers with earnest congratulations, and sat in council together to create the Government of the United States of America.

Had Virginia, Georgia, and the Carolinas then foreseen the abuses that have found shelter in the wreck of the Constitution during the last ten years, it is beyond question that this Federal Government would never have been created.

But, looking back over that period, and seeing how they in fact "builded wiser than they knew," and finding in the hearts of the people of the country an honest and abiding faith in the true principles of the Government they ordained, which can save it and has saved it from perversion and ruin, they enter again the triumphant progress of the States and the people towards a destiny, which now seems to be assured, higher than any country has ever accomplished.

The restoration to the people of those constitutional rights which they have never agreed to surrender—which remain to them after four years of open warfare and nearly ten years of misrule and persecution—has removed the last obstacle to perfect reconciliation.

Peace is the fruit of reconciliation.

The peace of 1877 relieves the anguish and heals the heart-burnings of two wars—the open and honorable struggle of the war of 1861, and the military persecution of the war of 1867.

Its reconciliation reaches back to 1820, when the slavery question began to agitate the country; nay, it goes back to the birth-day of the Constitution, “with healing in its wings,” and cures the grief and bitter memories of the past.

Honest and patriotic people on all sides are prepared for this benediction of Heaven’s good will to man.

They desire that every human being shall be included in this blessing.

Those who conquered in the war of 1861 turn with confidence and affection to the people of the South, and welcome them as victors in the war of reconstruction.

They esteem us as men who fought honorably and in open warfare for what we believed to be our rights, and afterwards showed our devotion to the Constitution with constancy and long-suffering, when the mailed hand of oppression was laid heavily upon the Southern States.

They looked on in helpless grief and shame when they saw that those who avoided the fierce struggle of the war of 1861, and had followed the armies only to speculate upon the necessities of the country, had seized their victorious banners, and, followed by pillagers and no less heartless politicians, led on in a new war of reconstruction and conquest. In the darkest times they stood by us and spoke to us in words of encouragement, and conjured us to forbear to shed blood in the defence of our rights and liberties. We listened and suffered, and withheld our hands, and waited for the hour of deliverance; and, now that it has come, we rejoice with them in fraternal peace and unity over the restoration of constitutional rule to our beloved country.

The desire of the people for peace and reconciliation existed, and was a controlling sentiment for years, during which the politicians kept them apart and seemingly in bitter antagonism.

Few of this class of rulers have been present on occasions, so credible to humanity, when the people have given sad but genuine expression to their reconciliation. During the last spring, and on many previous occasions, the people met in true sympathy, and those who had only met in battle before knelt around the graves of friends and foes alike, and scattered flowers over the ashes of their heroic dead, whose glory has at last become the equal heritage of pride to the whole American family.

This reconciliation is not on either side the result of humiliating confession of wrongs done to the country or to posterity. It has not followed the pardoning of offences.

It has been reached through the only means that were possible to men who have any self-respect, the manly recognition of the fact that the war was not on either side a crime.

Criminals, whether pardoned or punished to the satisfaction of the law, cannot "dwell together in unity" and as brethren with those who are virtuous and good.

When the people unite with those who are denounced as criminals and traitors, it proves either that the good have become demoralized or that they do not believe the accusation.

The latter is the true proposition. The people reject a denunciation that they feel to be unjust, and will some day expunge it from the laws.

The war of 1861 was not on either side a crime. It was the necessary result of a conflict of interests and convictions which were too deep-seated and too important to be yielded to anything but overpowering force.

What nation or race of people has ever become great without struggles and bloodshed? It has been so frequently necessary that it has almost become a rule of national progress and elevation to use the sword in cutting loose from the clogs and incumbrances that gather in the form of influence, wealth, and prejudice around effete institutions.

This fact has had a great influence in reconciling the South to the fate of slavery. Whether it was right or wrong, it had passed under condemnation.

The sword was necessary, and would have been necessary under any circumstances to execute the sentence of the enlightened nations, as we esteem them, against African slavery in the South.

The South would never have tolerated slavery as a means of darkening the barbarism of the African. They believed, and still believe, that they have done more for his civilization and enlightenment than he can ever do for himself in this country or in his native land, with all the assistance of all the nations of the earth.

The "sin of slavery" they never felt. If this is moral obliquity, they are still blind.

But whether they were right or wrong in these opinions and sentiments, they were not criminal in defending with arms a right which had the express sanction and protection of the Constitution. This was their only remedy, or else the whole North was criminal in boasting of their purpose to abolish slavery by any means that might be found necessary. Our great doubt was as to the honesty of this declaration; but those who revile us as rebels and traitors cannot now deprive us of the defense that we believed that their declarations were the true expression of their designs.

When thirty millions of people of the same blood, having the same government, go to war for opinion's sake, for principle, for personal and

political rights, or to preserve their institutions or constitutions, or to defeat usurpation, or for honor's sake—and not for dominion or conquest, or subjugation, or the spoils of war—it is a presumptuous abuse of language and a perversion of the truth that any should characterize either party with degrading epithets, or impute to either a criminal purpose in sustaining a cause upon which they bestow the highest and best proofs of honest devotion.

More conspicuous is the injustice of such recrimination, when, in a free government like ours, the people first express their opinions through the ballot-box on the morality, justice, policy, and constitutionality of every measure affecting the general welfare.

The American people were neither seduced, surprised, nor betrayed into the war of 1861. After a vain search, the conquerors failed to find a vicarious sufferer who could personate the alleged treason of the people. The truth was, there was no head to the rebellion against the Union in the South, or to the rebellion against the Constitution in the North. The people on both sides, in their entire body, were the offenders.

Mr. Lincoln, who was not an Abolitionist before the war, was forced by the pressure of popular clamor and a supposed military necessity, to declare the emancipation of the negroes, and Mr. Davis, who was a pronounced friend of the Union, was compelled to draw the sword against it to avoid the crime of treason in defending the rights of the States, assailed through the institution of slavery, with arms within the Union. His jailor, while he was a prisoner, punished him for treason in a manner befitting the Inquisition, but his judges never took heart to hear a demurrer to the indictment.

There was no treason in the war. There was no traitor of any note to either flag during the war. The causes of the war had such deep hold on the convictions of the people that every man fought as he would have fought for his family or his religion.

For more than forty years the people had warned and admonished each other in every solemn form that warring opinions and angry debates were steadily approaching a crisis that would compel hostile conclusions between warring States. Every test of the ballot during that period had developed a growing determination on both sides to yield nothing that was involved in the issues that were then agitating the country. Many compromises were devised by generous and patriotic men, who set high examples of personal sacrifice before the people, but their counsels were rejected. Compromise was as fuel to the flame. Advice and warning were lost on the people.

Within a few years before the war America was, in rapid succession, bereft of the three men who have added to her fame the chief glory of the 19th century. Twenty centuries may not produce the equal of either

Clay, Webster, or Calhoun. They had all, through lives of long public service, participated in the great discussions which involved every phase of this question of slavery, and had weighed all considerations affecting it in any degree. They did not in all things agree; in one they did, that slavery was under the express protection of the Constitution of the United States. In another matter, they also agreed. As death summoned each of them to his departure from earth, he turned his thoughts to his country. In the throes of dissolution he was reminded of its sad impending fate and, intensifying his plea by the solemnity of his situation, almost in his last breath, he warned his countrymen of the danger, and plead with them for forbearance towards each other.

They had anchors of hope cast within the vail to save them when death should prove conqueror; and, reminded by these of the necessity of a steadfast anchorage for their beloved country, they pointed the people to the Constitution, and implored them to hold to it, and trust it.

The people quoted their great arguments in the Senate to support their convictions and strengthen their resolves, but left their dying admonitions unheeded.

If the war was a crime, it was a crime of the people of both sections infatuated by a zeal that incriminated every man who voted his honest opinions; and so every man was guilty who fought to maintain them.

If those only were innocent who, having voted for war, refused to fight, but preferred to coin the blood of the people into gold through base speculations or the emoluments of civil offices, it were better to have been guilty. There are men who refused to fight as they voted, and now, with epigrammatic insolence, advise men who were honest soldiers to vote as they shot.

A recurrence to these matters would be without profit or fitness on this occasion, when peace is the subject of our reflections, only that the truth of history, as revealed in the actions of those who fought in the civil war, is the only test by which we can determine whether that peace, which has at last hung its white banners in the heavens, is a true and genuine reconciliation, or only a hollow truce. Is it a restoration of the country to the solid foundations of confidence and regard, whence peace flows like a river from its fountains beneath the eternal hills; or is it a mere soothing of angry resentments which linger in malicious concealment awaiting the hot breath of some fanatical demagogue to kindle them again into fury?

If it is merely an allayed excitement smoothed into temporary quiet by the silken hand of policy there are bad and dangerous men who will arouse it again.

Then our condition will be worse than it has ever been. Confidence will be gone—respect for each other will be changed for disgust—and we will abandon forever all hopes of peace under our free government.

Fear will drive us to take shelter under despotism, that we may secure repose by the force of some imperial will—having failed to obtain peace by the honorable consent of our brethren, based upon a candid survey of the past, and a good understanding for the future.

If we agree that the peace, that we now hail with rejoicing, is the result of a final conclusion of the people that the States are to have and enjoy—within the Union and under the Constitution as it is—the right of local self-government as it now exists, that peace will be enduring.

If, otherwise, the right is claimed for the Federal Government to reconstruct the States, as occasion may offer, through the war-making power of the President, or Congress, so as to conform their laws, constitutions, and official rosters to the will of the dominant party in the Union, we will have strife that will end in destruction.

I have faith in the peace of 1877. It is just, reasonable, honorable, and constitutional; and for these reasons it is commended to the hearts of strong men North and South, who intend to stand by it, and see that it is maintained.

Conflicts of opinions and of interests may again arise between the sections of the country, divided by lines of latitude or longitude; but we have all learned that forbearance is a virtue. The people have deliberately reviewed all the grounds upon which the peace of 1877 is founded, and after many tests of the ballot since 1865, they have finally decreed that it is fixed, permanent, and inviolable.

The volunteer armies of 1861 to 1865, in the main, have sustained the peace which they conquered and declared. But while they were hanging up their arms and furling their banners at the close of the war, men took possession of the civil power and eagerly broke the solemn covenant of blood, not a drop of which had ever flowed from their opened veins, and to them the country now justly attributes the calamities and disorders of the past ten years.

They were heartless politicians, who would reap the harvest of victory where they had not sowed the blood of the battle-field.

They gained the sympathies and support of a confiding people by appealing to the sentiments and passions that were quickened by the horrors of warfare, and, as a reward for their simulated griefs, were placed in offices that gave them the power to crush the helpless and to plunder them under the forms of law and in the name of the United States. Once in power they quickly did their work, and improvised a new army of enlisted men to sustain them in measures at which the true armies of the North, who had gone home in triumph, would have revolted.



But who, of all this host of oppressors, can now stand up before the world and dare to claim its honest judgment on the history of his official life?

In this final and solemn judgment of the people, uttered through the ballot-box and put into execution by a bold and faithful Executive, the moral assurance of a lasting, honorable, and blessed peace receives its final confirmation.

The Southern people are parties to this covenant of peace, entitled to its benefits, and bound by its stipulations.

It is not a mere act of grace. It is not a mere boon or favor given to us to soothe the anguish or compensate for the misfortunes of the past. It is our due under the Constitution. If it had been the reward of long suffering in support of the Constitution, we should have well earned it; but it is our inheritance; ours by the highest title—and honor and duty, as well as our best interests, require that we should support, maintain, and defend it.

Not every man in the North accepts the peace or feels bound to support it, for some are found who, in their conduct and by open declaration, are its enemies. They disavow it as binding upon them, because they pretended to believe that we intended to violate it. Wishing it broken, they affect to distrust us because they assert that we will destroy it. But these men misunderstand us. They prefer to think evil of us. They studied us at too great a distance during the war; and since, they have studied us while the deep shadows of humiliation rested upon us, and the sullen defiance of tyranny and oppression was expressed in every act. When they have scanned us in the light of the sun of liberty and in the day of deliverance, they will be less afraid that we will break the honorable peace we have so long coveted.

They have heretofore studied our material resources, and the easiest and surest means of appropriating them, and seem to distrust us as covenant-breakers because we were querulous at the liberties they took with our rights.

We were not covenant-breakers. We have kept the faith with all who have ever relied upon our honor. Even with those who have oppressed us we have never broken faith.

It is true that insulted justice has dared to bring to its bar some of the most corrupt and most dangerous men, who have set the law at defiance; and this is complained of already as a breach of the peace of 1877. But we should be unworthy of any peace but that of oblivion if we could accept any conditions which such malefactors would demand as the price of a base and disgraceful condonation of their crimes.

Liberty is not acceptable to the people of the South when it is polluted with corruption.

These men in the North who oppose this peace of 1877 know that it has destroyed their vocation.

The States that they sought to destroy have survived their evil machinations, and now they hiss their fierce anathemas into the ears of an offended country.

They are chiefly of that class whose treachery to their own convictions betrayed them at a late day into the Abolition party.

They joined that party in the hope of gaining power and place, after they had bestowed upon it the labor of years in denunciation of its purposes.

They were chiefly Democrats of the States-Rights school, who were converted by the troubles which had lost that party its ascendancy in the Government into consolidationists and coercionists.

They readily became warriors of the home-guard; minute-men in making military arrests; judge-advocates, to prosecute citizens within the States where civil law still was supreme, and to execute upon them sentences of banishment and death. They were the faithful jailors of women, and even of children, who fell under the suspicion of exercising liberty of thought.

While battles raged in other States, they gave to the country their best efforts to save their talents until the gathering in of the spoils of victory should require their services. When the war had ended they begun the great work of confiscation. Some mounted the bench; some rose at the bar; some prowled about the country as marshals, with retinues of spies and informers at their heels. They seized whatever was valuable. They met afterwards in court, and condemned without mercy, and divided without shame the spoils wrested from a powerless people. These resources failing, from exhaustion, they determined to seize the offices of the country, and, through the power to tax the people, to confiscate their little earnings accumulated since the war.

Then they became the Robespierres and Marats of the revolution of 1867—leading the hordes of plunderers, who, with halters, had strangled poor men suspected only of being rich: who with incendiary torches had fired the houses of sleeping families, and filled dungeons with brave men, because they had fought to sustain what they had formerly preached.

Reconstructionists, who, with avowed contempt of the Constitution, rudely trampled upon the rights and powers of the prostrate States, whose sovereignty they had in former years bowed themselves down to worship. Since Heaven has willed that their works shall perish, rather than those against whom they have wrought injustice and iniquity, they now assume another *role*. They are now Nationalists—artfully concealing behind a name the design that struggles in their hearts, and impatiently waiting for an opportunity for action, they would sweep out of

existence the whole fabric of the American system of government, with its thirty-nine written constitutions, and would plant upon its ruins a military oligarchy, with its capital in a fortified camp. Such a place as Washington City was in the closing hours of the nine years' sway of reconstruction, when a significant array of frowning batteries admonished Congress that while that war continued military power would enforce its own decrees, whatever might be the expressed will of the people.

In the South these malcontents still have a meager following. These few are a class peculiar to Southern politics.

No other country could have presented the conditions under which their existence was possible.

In the beginning they zealously urged the demands of the people of the South on all the issues that had led to the war of 1861.

They did not believe that war was possible, and in this supposed security they raged for it.

When the war surprised them in their violent demonstrations, a few ventured into the first campaign as quartermasters and the like. Many took refuge in agriculture, and made peace-offerings of beef and bacon to appease the demands of the conscription. Others began to murmur their convictions that the war was being waged at the expense of civil rights.

It was a very just war, they said, but it was not conducted with sufficient delicacy by some of the Generals in matters of personal rights. They were chiefly men of wealth, but they complained with most disinterested protestations that it was a "rich man's war and a poor man's fight," and, as the rich did not all desire to fight, the poor should not be allowed to continue the struggle.

When the four years' war was ended, and peace appeared to be assured, those who had fought in the Confederate armies and had gained the heartfelt gratitude of their countrymen, though their cause was lost, stood aside in a spirit of self-denial, and, to encourage a feeling of amity between men of all grades of opinions, invited these men to take the lead in public affairs.

They accepted the situation, but it was a poor one, for robbery and plunder were not then the perquisites of office.

The revolution of 1867 promised richer rewards for public service, and when it offered them employment they again accepted the situation, and with it the blood-money of their new allies.

When that second war came, with political intriguers and spoilsmen for its generals, thieves, bummers and camp-followers for its soldiery, and the paroled prisoners of the war of 1861 and a poor and helpless people for its victims, these men were found among the most unpitiful and aggressive of all these hordes. Some of these were natives of the South;

others are not claimed by any country. With permanent peace their vocation ends. They feebly and despairingly unite their voices with the disappointed revolutionists of the North in their protests against the peace of 1877.

The people of the North who approve and support this final adjustment are those who recognize and obey the authority of the Constitution. They trust no man with their liberties who, in legislation, in administration, in policy or in judgment, in peace or in war, goes outside the Constitution to find the sources of his civil power or the sanctions of his conduct in public affairs.

Such men feel the pulsations of fraternal regard that beat in honest hearts in all sections of the country, and are not restrained by lines of latitude in expressing their cordial response. They do not despise the weak nor worship the powerful. They do not believe that the moral worth of five millions of Americans has been settled against their pretensions to virtuous and patriotic love of country, and against their right to be esteemed as worthy of respect and confidence, by the fact that they fought four years and did not resist successfully thirty millions of Americans. They do not believe that only those are worthy of trust who belonged to the victorious power.

With supporters like these, the country need not fear that peace and reconciliation will not abide in the land.

I turn now to those in the South who support this great work, and I will endeavor to establish the proposition that they will abide by it with fidelity, and maintain it with honor and zeal.

I know that distrust is ready to meet us at the door of many an honest heart; that passion and prejudice are not yet extinguished or removed from every mind; that differences of opinion yet exist amongst us, the discussion of which recalls the bitterness and intolerance of former strife.

We feel that this distrust is not deserved by the people of the South, because they acted with good conscience and without any criminal intent or purpose in their great controversy with the North.

If we have now met in peace and reconciliation upon the broad concessions, mutually accepted, that the war was not a crime, we need not inquire who was right or who was wrong. Nor need we concern ourselves whether the one side or the other retains the bitter memories of the war with the greater tenacity. Controversies between States are not capable of being adjusted by reference solely to the temper of mind which may influence even a majority of the people.

Peace would never follow any war if it could only be established after the people had forgotten or had ceased to cherish their bitter animosities.

When the cause of war is removed, it is a crime in any people to refuse to make peace.

It is due to the President of the United States, who has inaugurated this restoration of the Constitution, and to the people of the North who support him in this policy, and it is but justice to ourselves, that we should be able to assure them, that on our part, we intend to keep this peace inviolate.

This is sufficiently established by the fact that we have no motive for any other line of conduct. And this fact is demonstrated when we turn to the Constitution of the United States, and find that it protects every right that we claim; that it is now recognized as the supreme law, and that those in power respect their oaths to support and obey it. What further have we to ask or desire? But our claims upon the confidence of the country rest on higher grounds than our personal interests.

It is not a very pleasing duty to argue with your brother, or a stranger, the facts and deductions which should justify or encourage him in the confidence that you mean to deal honestly and justly with him. But our sectional estrangement has so long existed, and has been attended with such unseemly vituperation in all quarters, that those who desire that a better feeling should be encouraged, ought carefully to remove any possible distrust which may retard the restoration of mutual confidence and good will. In doing this, nothing is gained by uncandid protestations of affectionate regard, or by concealing the opinions and sentiments which we honestly entertain. It is probable that we shall live together a great many years—I trust it may be centuries, and that as time advances, we shall become more strongly attached by ties of common interests.

It would seem to be impossible to misconceive the precise effects of the war of 1861 upon the Constitution of the country, and it is absurd to assume that any change in the organic law was effected beyond that set forth in those amendments that have been added to it. So that we know fully the results of the war upon our Government.

The States of the South have adopted the thirteenth amendment, and have accepted the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. These are a part of the Constitution. We did not like them or approve them, but we have bound ourselves collectively as States, and in our State Constitutions, as well as by multiplied oaths taken on all possible occasions, by our people individually, to support and obey those amendments as parts of the Constitution of the United States. We can do no more except to live up to our pledges.

We yielded, in some of our State Constitutions, the right of secession. This was not required of us, and we surrendered it, because we supposed the Northern States would demand it. That was claimed to be an issue involved in the war. Some of those who fought the hardest and longest

declared that this doctrine was the cause of the war, and was, of course, the object of their most intense hate.

It was the immediate cause of hostilities in the form in which they were opened, and unless the South had believed in the right of secession as an essential element of State sovereignty, it is most likely that war would not have ensued between the States. It would have been a war between the people, and we should have had anarchy within the States. If the same number of men that were engaged in the war of 1861 had fought with the same vigor, under partizan leadership and organization, and not under the State organizations, anarchy would have reigned throughout the country.

The abolishment of slavery would have resulted in the abolishment of State Governments; in the destruction of the Union beyond all the power of restoration; and the final overthrow of Republican Government on this continent.

The people of the United States must abandon the idea that war is to be a remedy for any abuse or usurpation, or they must recognize the doctrine that it is best, whether right or wrong, constitutional or unconstitutional, if war must come, that it should be between States as organizations, and not under control of partisan leaders merely.

For one half of a century Mexico has furnished us with a sad historical proof of this proposition.

The Southern States in a nervous solicitude to satisfy the people of the North that they intended to remain forever at peace, cut themselves off, by constitutional provisions, from all access to the means of making war or of defending themselves by lawful measures as organized bodies.

If they fight again, it must be with halters around their necks. They have given their pledges, and delivered their hostages to keep the peace. The Northern States have accepted them, but they have given nothing in return to bind them to like conditions.

They are free, and have proved themselves wisely diligent to preserve their State Constitutions and the Federal Constitution free from any provisions that may hamper their future action.

The historian who may hereafter consider this peculiar condition of the States will be astonished to find that a great war, fought, as is claimed, to destroy the treasonable doctrine of secession, should have closed without any apparent impression being left upon the Constitution relating to that subject, while the abolition of slavery, which was claimed not to have been the purpose of the war, but a mere incident of the hostilities—a necessary war measure—was provided for in three solemn amendments. It is for the North to answer on this question. The South was as ready to place a quietus upon this question as the North was to demand it. But it was not demanded. Those who hereafter quarrel with the doctrine of

secession must quarrel with the North, where it was first asserted as a right of the States, and not with the Southern States that have surrendered it.

The South is willing to trust the North on this question. Our incomparable physical geography, giving us the world-wide monopoly of the cotton growth, our soil that is capable of sustaining a larger proportionate population than China or India, our inviting climate, our exhaustless minerals, furnish us with every resource of national wealth and power.

We shall not be impoverished if any of the States shall find an association with us in the Federal Union incompatible with their interests or their moral sensibilities and should prefer to go in peace. We shall not wish to withdraw. The sceptre of wealth and power is again within our grasp.

The enfranchisement of the negro has added so materially to our political power that we have ceased to fear that we shall be buffeted about at the will of a despotic majority-power in the country.

Faithful to the Constitution, we will see that it is obeyed in letter and spirit in the South, and so we will consolidate our power, and its impregnable citadel of strength will be in the hearts of our people of all races and conditions.

Those who fear that we will oppress the free negroes, do not understand either our feelings or our interests. Our interest in slavery was never so great as our interest in our slaves. And now that they are free, our concern for their personal welfare is naturally greater than it is for their political promotion. We desire to benefit them practically. We did not enslave them. If their enslavement was a sin, it is not at our door. They were brought to us as slaves, and from a slave country; and chiefly, by Northern slave-dealers.

Few Southern eyes ever witnessed the horrors of the middle passage, and fewer Southern ships ever sailed in the slave-trade.

We have not added a shadow to the darkness of their native barbarism. On the contrary, we have used the code under which they were born; the system of laws adopted instinctively by their rulers, as all systems of unrevealed law have been adopted by all races of men; and we have added to it, in their government, the revealed law which contains statutes adapted to such people. We have thus educated and enlightened them until they compare favorably in actual knowledge with many civilized and christianized peoples; until our own brethren have thought them worthy to be set in authority over the people who have been their only teachers.

We believe that as a body of people they are deficient in the faculties which comprise the power to govern with wisdom and safety, in that highest form of civilized government, the constitutional republic of the



United States; but they can fully enjoy its blessings; and it is to our interest, and in full accordance with our desires, that they should do so. They can participate with safety in the electoral franchise, and when left to the guidance of their own free wills, they will do themselves and the country justice. At all events, we cannot afford to surrender the political power that depends upon their right of suffrage.

These plain statements seem to dispense with further argument as to the grounds of our satisfaction with our present relations to the United States, and of our faith in the future prosperity of the South.

There are still higher grounds upon which we feel that we are justly entitled to repose confidence, and to receive confidence, when we assert our intention to abide by the decisions which were the result of the war.

I refer confidently to the character of the American people, which, after all, is the vital power of the government, and the foundation of every hope of the future. Our government rests on that character, and looks to it, as pledged in oaths of fidelity for the maintenance of justice towards the people and the States.

If oaths are not sufficient to hold a free people to the line of duty, nothing that is consistent with liberty will ever secure this end.

Without confidence and forbearance amongst the people, the government cannot be long maintained.

No country can be so unhappy as that where every man feels that every other man who may oppose him in his political opinions, is a traitor to his country. Sometimes, the people acting under great excitement, seem to be controlled by such thoughts; but the moment a result is obtained, and declared by lawful authority, it is peacefully accepted, and the people assume their wonted friendship.

An illustration was furnished, in the events with which this year began, of the love of the people for their country and its institutions and for each other, rising above their regard for any man or any party, or anything except the written Constitution and the law as declared by legitimate authority, that should shame into silence those who traduce the honor of the people of the country.

In this great matter of the Presidential election, the Democrats of the South and the whole country felt that they had been victimized and betrayed by a false confidence reposed in the most important tribunal which has existed in this country since 1787; and while millions of them believed, and still believe, that its judgment was a mere expression of partisan injustice, yet that judgment stood for law and admitted of no appeal, and they obeyed it. They consented to look to their lawful power to correct it hereafter at the ballot-box, and to provide against its recurrence by additional laws.

It was expected of the people in the South that, through the alliance of Democrats in the North and West, they would seek to avenge them-

selves for the losses and sufferings of the past by dragging the country into civil war.

When we disappointed those to whom "the wish was father to the thought" and refused to make or to suffer war to establish a presidential succession, they taunted us with a want of spirit and decried our boasted chivalry. They should have known that whatever of blood our people have shed, or may have to shed, on questions of controversy with their brethren, is consecrated to the cause of the Constitution of their country.

Neither malice, nor revenge, nor lust of power, nor even any wrong or insult, however grievous, for which the Constitution and laws afford a remedy has caused us, or will ever cause us to open our veins, or theirs, in any controversy with our brethren. But a fatal blow, aimed at that instrument, which no other means can meet or parry, will never find our hearts too weak for resentment, nor our arms too feeble to strike in its defence.

The men who saved the land from bloodshed in 1877, because the Constitution, though in some sense violated, was not broken beyond the reach of a peaceful remedy, are the same who in 1861 attempted to supply the remedy of armed resistance against those who outlawed their rights, and declared them beyond the pale of the Constitution.

Many of these men yet live, and their sons, who were little children in 1861, have taken the places of their heroic dead, with not a vacancy in the ranks to tell that ever one was lost. It is a mistake to suppose that they are numerically weak, or that they are broken in spirit.

Those heroes of a thousand battle-fields, whose very graves are lost beyond the power of recognition, are all replaced with men just such as they were; men who have no higher conceptions of honor and glory than to wish to live or die just such as they were; men who feel that the grave of every Confederate soldier contains the ashes of a patriot whose memory is a sacred legacy—fathers and sons, they are the same men now that they have always been.

These younger men, however, are not amenable to any accusation of treason, except that they had hearts to love their venerable fathers and the cause which they espoused; their brothers, and the country whose bosom was bathed with the outpouring of their blood.

The framers of the Constitution, remembering that its most important principles were born of Anglo-Saxon rebellion against royal power, and that attainder and confiscation had too often been the badges of a noble martyrdom, protected the children of rebels against confiscation and their blood against attainder by positive provisions of the organic law.

How insulting to the spirits of the great men who ordained this Constitution is that unworthy prejudice which would visit upon the children, even then unborn, the penalties which have been denounced against

their fathers. The American people cannot dishonor themselves by the encouragement or toleration of a feeling so unworthy.

These young men have not been taught to hate the Government of the United States, but they have been taught to hold as enemies to their country those who trample upon and spurn its Constitution after having been sworn to defend it.

But few of those remain who had passed the meridian of life in 1861. They are tottering along the steep declivities of life, without purse or scrip, looking hopefully to a future where peace is eternal, and feeling that the work of life has been faithfully accomplished. The honor and reverence bestowed upon them by the people of the South compensates them for the privations and hardships which followed the sacrifices they made of all their wealth and influence to the cause that commanded their homage.

The soldiers of the Confederacy are now, as they have been since 1861, the representative men of the South. Those who would comprehend the people of the South must know them and their children.

When I speak of the soldiers of the Confederacy as representative men, I do not mean that they have sought or received recognition as the official exponents of the opinions of the people. Deference to the opinions of their friends in other sections, and a just regard for the policy that was thought to be the wisest in the restoration of peace, confidence and composure to the country, led them to decline any unavoidable part in the public councils.

Some politicians in the South also demanded that they should take "back seats," and they took them cheerfully, until the people required them to come to the front.

Neither do I exclude from the honorable title of Confederate soldiers the men and women who devoted themselves, through their sympathies, prayers, labors, sacrifices, and sufferings, and gave their property, comfort, and ceaseless toil to the cause of the Confederacy.

The honors of the battle-field won by their soldiers are not a more precious remembrance to the people of the South than the heroic devotion and sufferings of their mothers, sisters, and wives. Whatever may be the judgment of those who yet live amidst the lingering shadows of that great struggle, human nature will never find in the history of all the generations past and to come a higher or more worthy example of patriotism and sacrificial devotion than was furnished us in the conduct of the women of the Confederacy.

Woman cannot espouse, with her soul's deepest and truest devotion, a cause that is not just and honorable. If she doubts the cause in which her husband or son suffers or is lost, her bereavement has no bounds. It is misery without consolation. Philosophy, or religion even, affords no balm for the wounded spirit.

The Confederate cause had a place in the hearts of the women of the South, where no doubt could find a lodgment. When the dearest ties were severed in that cause they suffered the bereavement in silent, uncomplaining grief, feeling sustained by the purest and highest motives, as they bore upon their bleeding hearts a rich sacrifice of love to the altars of their country.

For the same reasons that inspired our soldiers, the wives and mothers of the country were as willing to give their loved ones to their country as they were to die in its service.

When the battle was over, and the faithful and true one was lost to his loved ones at home, the life of the husband and the love of the wife, blended in a sweet incense of free-offering, ascended together to Heaven.

Did not you, my comrades, act worthily, according to your most sincere and solemn sense of duty, when you entered the field to sustain convictions and defend rights which were thus felt and understood by the mothers, wives and daughters of the land?

Was not their honor, their future welfare, their safety against evils which seemed to threaten the sacred things of your home circles the decisive influence which called you to arm for the defence of your country?

Not a selfish thought of personal aggrandizement influenced you, not a doubt disturbed your reflections as to the merits of the controversy that commanded your devotion.

No lingering apprehensions of mistaken duty hung upon your resolution to impede your progress, or to cause you to falter in your course.

Under the guide of your own convictions, after having reflected maturely and voted with unconstrained freedom, you felt that the ballot-box could not protect your rights, and you grasped your musket.

You stood on the defensive, feeling that you had no responsibilities then, or in the past, for the spirit of aggression which had set itself to the abolishing of slavery. This you believed would overwhelm the South with ruin, degrade it to a political vassalage, deprave it to a social position which you could not contemplate without abhorrence.

When they left their homes to join the army, whether their feet pressed for the last time the marble threshold of palace or the rude door-sill of a log cabin, the soldiers of the Confederacy went forth with equal alacrity. Their purposes, hopes, and resolves were the same. Their cause was one, and without any distinctions or jealousies they united in its defence; poured out their blood in a common libation beneath its banners; fell side by side; their ashes mingle in undistinguishable brotherhood, and their fame is one common legacy to their country.

No more unjust or disparaging misrepresentation was ever made than that which imputed to the non-slaveholders, or the poor man of the

South, reluctance in fighting its battles. It was the base suggestion of cowardly demagogues, who avoided the fields where Confederate laurels were being won, and sought to stop the war before public opinion would compel them to fight.

They hoped to influence the people of the States to withdraw their armies, and cared not though they should leave the men abandoned on the fields who were winning honors for the South that more than compensated all their sufferings.

This false accusation maligns the true people of the South. It perverts that living truth, which shines like a star in the night of error, that the Southern soldier took up arms for no other motive and for no other inducement than to defend a country that he loved, and a cause that commanded the unbought allegiance of his heart.

No men have ever exhibited, in their faithful service and fortitude, a higher degree of proof that their hearts were in a cause than those who were called the "poor men of the South." They were in no respect poor, though by comparison with others they were not rich in the things which save men from honest toil.

In spirit, independence, honest self-appreciation, in their lineage, and in proud exaltation of sentiment they had riches, inherited from their fathers, which the people of America have valued as above all price.

In the heraldry of their lineage, the wars of the Revolution, the war of 1812, and the war with Mexico are inscribed as the events which sealed the patents of their nobility.

I am proud, my countrymen, to adopt for you that title—"the poor men of the South"—which, though applied by those who knew you not as a badge of your inferiority and poverty of spirit, is yet the highest proof that your "glory which the world cannot take away" was earned in a struggle that involved honor, justice and liberty only, and in which you had neither gold nor slaves to protect, to gain, or to lose.

Could your traducers have seen you when you left your homes, and when you returned after the war, they would scarcely believe that you had been compelled to take up arms by a power you could not resist.

When you left your humble but loved homes, where virtue and contentment had made your lives so happy, your sinking, saddened heart was lifted up and your soul was strengthened when you saw the stars of hope glittering in the tears that were shed by your wife as she gave you to God and your country, as they had given you to her. Her clinging arms almost refused to yield you to the battle's fury, but she would not ask you to stay. The familiar fields where you had toiled in peace through many years and the sentinel forests standing around were the last witnesses of your grief at the parting.

When the lord of the log cabin had passed beyond the view of the lonely watchers at its door a brief prayer was uttered, a quaint musical voice sang the old hymn of faith,

"How firm a foundation ye saints of the Lord,"

and with a deft and busy hand, and a fortitude worthy of an honest mother's faith in God, she turned to her homely duties, and your house was set in order for the war. It would be a sad thought that language cannot convey a just idea of the beauty and excellence of character manifested by these silent, suffering, toiling, trusting, faithful women, if it were not that the great story is reserved for that day when Heaven shall reveal it in its fullness as the fairest chapter in the history of mankind.

The greatest of your trials was to remain in the army, far away from your homes, when you knew that hunger, sickness, and distress in almost every form, were invading them. At long intervals the travel worn letters from home would reach you in the distant camp. In plaintive but uncomplaining narrative your almost martyr wife would tell you how the cattle had been impressed; the horse had been taken from the plow by raiders; the corn had been nearly consumed, and of meat there was none; the children were languishing in sickness, and medicines had even been declared contraband of war; that as she toiled in the hot field by day, and spun by the pine torch at night, rumors would often come that brought the pangs of widowhood and orphanage to the little circle at home; but, thanking God that this calamity had been spared them, she closed with prayer that you might return, a free and independent man, to a country worthy of your citizenship, and to a family proud of your achievements.

Your devotion under such circumstances, which are but a mere glimpse of the trials you endured for years, ought to convince every honorable man that a government which lays a just claim to your allegiance, by securing your rights under its Constitution, will receive in return the most faithful support.

Your children, reared amidst such hardships, became sadly wise and self-reliant. In facing dangers that might well have appalled the stoutest men, they came to be familiar with them in childhood. They have listened to the fireside traditions of the war from night to night, as related by their fathers and mothers, and weaving them into the woof of their own experiences they understand the war in all its vast and sanguinary history. Not once have they doubted that their fathers fought in a just cause. Not a word of reproach against the Confederate States, its army or its leaders, have they ever heard uttered by any sufferer who fought for its cause.

They are men now, and comprise with yourselves, the essential power of the South.

No stinging of dishonor, no shame for past delinquencies of duty, no sense of humiliation in the presence of those who were victorious in the war, makes you or them reluctant to meet our former enemies face to face in frank, open, manly and honest agreement for the future.

You demand no guarantees except obedience to the Constitution, and you offer none but these.

Such an element of population is worthy of the confidence, respect and proud regard of any nation.

The country cannot afford to hold these people in a state of dishonorable subjection. Granting that they would long remain in such suberviency, the loss of power for good, and the increase of power for evil, would so deeply affect the confidence of the people in the future of the Government, that it would soon cost the country more billions of dollars to balance the material losses occasioned by such folly, than it has cost to bring them to that condition.

This imperfect view of the facts, opinions, convictions and sentiments of the people of the South, on which they claim the respect and confidence of the people of the entire country, ought to be sufficient to quiet the apprehensions of such as are least willing to extend to us the fraternal hand of reconciliation.

Men who are not true to themselves are not to be trusted to keep their covenants with others.

No man can be trusted as the guardian of his own rights or of the rights of others who is incapable of feeling a wrong, and unwilling to redress it.

But we turn with confidence to a still higher plane on which Americans can meet and unite in making the future of our country as happy, as the past has been unhappy. All causes of sectional strife are removed. There remains no justifiable excuse for longer indulgence in the bitter recollections of the past. Neither section has cause to feel humiliated in association with the other. Any nation would feel proud to welcome the States of the South or of the North into fellowship or alliance. Why should we grudgingly or with reluctance consent to such honorable association? It is certain that prosperity cannot result from longer contention; peace cannot hold its happy sway while discord reigns in the hearts of the people. There are none, not even the most virulent enemies of peace and restoration, who would willingly protract the era of strife and dissension forever. Once in power even they would turn with honeyed words of brotherly love to their late victims and bid them, in the name of the God of peace, to arise and be enfolded in their broad and tranquil bosoms.

There can be no motive to delay the return of the American people to the cordial relations, and to the pure love of a common country which



prevailed in the beginning of the century, save only to gratify a partisan desire to help those men to high positions who have been the chief barrier to the drawing together of the people.

If their friends think them worthy of reward, even as the enemies of peace, how much more ought they to rejoice to reward them as the magnanimous friends of a reconciled and happy country.

The American people, moved by an impulse of mutual affection long restrained by unworthy resentments, have, at a single step, risen to the height of their former glory. "A union of hearts and a union of hands" has made them again one people.

In the beginning and in the end, before the war and since the war, the vital question was whether the Constitution, with its guarantees to the States of the right local self-government, could be preserved during the tempest that swept the institution of slavery from this continent.

It was long submerged beneath the billows of anarchy and despotism, but at last they have subsided, revealing the old rock of the Constitution standing secure and firm on its eternal foundations.

Gathered upon this rock, with honor untarnished, spirit undismayed, their souls elate with noble aspirations and aflame with love of country, the soldiers and people of the Confederate States are at home again, welcomed to the honored abode of their fathers by the heroes who fought them in war, honored them in victory, and love them in peace.

General Morgan was frequently interrupted with rapturous applause, and the thanks of the Society were warmly voted to the orator for his "able and eloquent address," and a copy requested for publication.

General Early paid a brief but touchingly-appropriate tribute to the memory of Admiral Raphael Semmes, late Vice-President of the Society for the State of Alabama, and, on motion of General Dabney H. Maury, the following minute was unanimously adopted:

The death of Admiral Raphael Semmes, the Vice-President of this Society for the State of Alabama, having occurred since the last annual meeting, the Society takes this occasion to express its high admiration for the exalted character, eminent abilities, and distinguished services of the deceased, and its profound regret for the loss the Society has sustained in his death; which is ordered to be entered on the Journal.

General D. H. Maury then read the following as the

**Fifth Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the Southern Historical Society, for Year Ending October 31st, 1877.**

The Executive Committee have to report that during the past year they have endeavored to keep in view the great objects of the trust committed to their charge; that they have steadily worked for the interests of the Society amid some peculiar difficulties, and that there has been most gratifying progress in our important work. The acknowledgments we have made from time to time attest that the kind interest of our friends has steadily added to our

**MATERIAL FOR A TRUE HISTORY OF THE WAR,**

until we have now a collection which is widely recognized as one of priceless value. The Secretary has received from all parts of this country and from Europe numbers of letters seeking information concerning events of the war, and in almost every instance he has been able to furnish from our archives the information sought. We have given to a number of writers facts, narratives, &c., to aid them in elucidating the truth of our Confederate history, and we have the most gratifying assurances that our publications are looked to as *high* authority, not only in the South, but also at the North and in Europe.

Our friends have given us with cheerful alacrity material which could readily be sold for thousands of dollars, but which is of *inestimable* value to the cause of truth; and yet there remains in private hands much that ought to be on our shelves.

**PUBLICATIONS.**

Our monthly has received the heartiest commendation from the press generally, and warm endorsement from leading Confederates, while we number among our constant readers some of the most distinguished Federal soldiers and some of the ablest military critics in Europe.

As to the *character* of our publications we have steadily pursued the policy announced in our last annual report, and unanimously approved by our last annual meeting; and we are gratified to

know that this policy meets with the well high universal approval of our friends.

We have now on hand copies of the first three volumes of our *Papers* handsomely bound; (the fourth volume will be ready 1st of January, next,) besides our "Confederate View of the Treatment of Prisoners," which we beg our friends to help us to circulate, and especially to place in every public library in the country.

We have reason to congratulate ourselves that, in spite of the unfavorable year we have had for the conduct of such an enterprise, we have been enabled to maintain our list of subscribers at about what it was twelve months ago, and that we have bright prospects for a large increase during the coming year; and we are satisfied that we only need efficient canvassers to swell our list of members and subscribers several thousand, within a short time.

#### CONFEDERATE ARCHIVES AT WASHINGTON.

In our last annual report we gave an account of our unsuccessful efforts to gain access to the Confederate archives in charge of the War Department at Washington.

In January last the Department reopened the correspondence with us, and seemed anxious to secure such documents as they need to complete their files. We reiterated our desire to give them the freest access to our archives, and to furnish them copies of anything they might desire, provided they would reciprocate; but, as they declined to allow us access to the "Archive Bureau," to give us in exchange any copies of documents, or to allow us any thing in return, save the doubtful advantage of *advance* sheets of the publication they propose to make, *when they shall be ready for the press*, we could not see that we would be justified in acceding to their proposition.

We call the earnest attention of the Society to this matter, and hope that such action will be taken as will induce all fair-minded men to oppose appropriating public funds to publishing the "Official History of the War" until the Department adopts such rules as will allow citizens of every section free and equal opportunity of inspecting and verifying the *originals* of documents which it is proposed to publish.

## FINANCES.

With the exception of the liberal donation of W. W. Corcoran, Esq., who, last November, added \$500 to his donation of the year before, the Committee has been dependent for the means of carrying on its work upon membership fees and subscriptions to our *Papers*.

The following summary will exhibit our receipts and disbursements, from November 1st, 1876, to October 30th, 1877:

## RECEIPTS.

Membership fees, subscriptions, and advertisements.....	4,244 45
Donation of W. W. Corcoran, Esq.....	500 00
Total receipts.....	\$4,744 45
Balance in treasury, as per last report.....	51 94
Total funds.....	<u>\$4,796 39</u>

## DISBURSEMENTS.

Paid on account of printing, stereotyping, and binding.....	2,584 43
Commissions to agents.....	646 32
Salary of Secretary.....	816 85
Pay of clerk, stationery, and miscellaneous office expenses.....	365 89
Postage, express, and telegrams.....	382 90
Total disbursements.....	<u>\$4,796 39</u>

We have liabilities on account of printing and binding amounting to \$2,100.

To liquidate this amount, we have the following assets:

Back Nos. of our Papers to make 2,000 volumes.....	4,000 00
1,500 copies "Treatment of Prisoners".....	1,500 00
Due us by agents.....	800 00
Renewal fees and subscriptions now due.....	300 00
Due from advertisers.....	175 90
Total.....	<u>\$6,775 00</u>

There will be due us on the 1st of January next, for renewal fees and subscriptions, \$3,600.

We have so far reduced our expenses, that if our receipts are as large next year as they have been during the past year, (and we have great reason to hope that they will be much larger), we will have no difficulty in meeting all of our expenses.

But we are in pressing need of means to enable us to adequately prosecute our great work, and we know not how a lover of the truth of history can better employ funds than by contributing them to the use of the Southern Historical Society.

In conclusion, we would express our growing sense of the importance of collecting *now*, the material for a true history of our great struggle for Constitutional freedom, and we earnestly appeal to all who can add *anything* of value to our collection, to do so *at once*.

By order of the Executive Committee.

DABNEY H. MAURY, *Chairman*.

J. WM. JONES, *Secretary*.

The report was unanimously adopted.

The President then announced the selection of General E. W. Pettus, of Selma, as Vice-President for Alabama; and Col. Thos. H. Carter, of King William county, Va., formerly Chief of Artillery of Rodes' Division, A. N. V., as a member of the Executive Committee to fill a vacancy.

### Leading Confederates on the Battle of Gettysburg.

We continue to give papers bearing on this great battle written by men who participated in it.

A few of our readers may weary of the discussion, but we have assurances from every quarter that this series is of deep interest, and of the highest historic value.

We take pleasure in giving the following from a gallant soldier who led gallant troops from the gallant "Old North State":

#### Letter from General James H. Lane.

VIRGINIA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE,  
BLACKSBURG, October 20, 1877.

Rev. J. WM. JONES, *Secretary Southern Historical Society,*  
Richmond, Va.:

MY DEAR SIR: As great injustice has been done my gallant old brigade of North Carolinians in all the published accounts of the battle of Gettysburg that I have seen, and as you are now publishing in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* the brigade-reports of that great battle, I hope you will also publish mine, which I herewith enclose. I am sure the public will consider this *official* paper, written about a month after the battle, a more valuable *historical* document than the many recent articles written from *memory*, which is at all times *treacherous*, and, as every Confederate soldier knows, particularly so as regards the incidents, &c., of our heroic struggle for independence. For instance, General Heth, in his letter in the October No., 1877,\* of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, in speaking of the fight of the 3d of July at Gettysburg, makes General Lee say, "I shall ever believe if General Pender had remained on his horse half an hour longer we would have carried the enemy's position," when the facts are, General Pender was mortally wounded on the right of his line by an artillery shot on the afternoon of the 2d of July, and was taken to the rear, where he was on the 3d of July, and could not even mount his horse. Surely General Heth could not have read the report of General A. P. Hill in the November No., 1876, of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, in which he says: "On the morning of the 3d the divisions of my corps occupied the same positions as on the 2d. \* \* \* \* I was directed to hold my line with Anderson's division and the half of Pender's, now commanded by Gen. Lane, and to order Heth's division, commanded by Pettigrew, and Lane's and Scales' brigades, of Pender's division, to report to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, as a support to his

corps in the assault on the enemy's lines." It is also evident that Gen. Heth had not read the report of General Lee, which appeared in the July No., 1876, of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, in which he says, in speaking of the fight on the 2d of July: "General Ewell had directed General Rodes to attack in concert with Early, covering his right, and had requested Brigadier-General Lane, then commanding Pender's division, to co-operate on the right of Rodes. \* \* \* General Lane was prepared to give the assistance required of him, and so informed General Rodes; but the latter deemed it useless to advance after the failure of Early's attack." And further: "In this engagement our loss in men and officers was large. Major-Generals Hood and Pender, Brigadier-Generals Jones, Semmes, G. T. Anderson, and Barksdale, and Col. Avery (commanding Hoke's brigade) were wounded, the last two mortally. Generals Pender and Semmes died after their removal to Virginia."

In his "Memorandum" (August No., 1877, of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*), Colonel Walter H. Taylor, in speaking of the fight on the 3d of July, says: "Had Hood and McLaws followed or supported Pickett, and Pettigrew and Anderson have been advanced, the design of the Commanding-General would have been carried out—the world would not be so at a loss to understand *what was designed* by throwing forward, unsupported, against the enemy's stronghold, so small a portion of the army." Now I happen to know, as one who had his horse shot under him in that celebrated charge, by the enemy which flanked us on the left, that Pettigrew, with his wounded hand in a sling, did advance Heth's division, and that very gallantly. After such a declaration, strange to say, Col. Taylor, in his "second paper" (September No., 1877, of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*), admits that Pettigrew advanced on the left of Pickett, and that he witnessed it. I suppose he was at the time on the left of the assaulting column with General Lee, who, he states, "finally took position about the Confederate centre, on an elevated point, from which he could survey the field and watch the result of the movement." The Colonel states further, that from that position *to the left*, "to one who observed the charge, it appeared that Pettigrew's line was not a continuation of that of Pickett's, but that it advanced in *echelon*." Further on he adds: "The assaulting column really consisted of Pickett's division—two brigades in front, and one in the second line as a support, with the brigade of Wilcox in the rear of its right to protect that flank; while Heth's division moved forward on Pickett's left in *echelon*, or with the alignment so imperfect and *so drooping on the left* as to appear in *echelon*, with Lane's and Scales' brigades in rear of its right." This statement does great injustice to Heth's division, under Pettigrew, as the line was neither drooping nor did it move in *echelon*. Colonel Taylor seems not



to have been aware, or to have forgotten that the assaulting column was not formed parallel to the enemy's position, but decidedly *oblique* to it; according to General Trimble, "Pickett being about three-fourths of a mile and Pettigrew one mile and a quarter from the enemy's line." From Colonel Taylor's position, then, to the *left*, the *apparent drooping* of Pettigrew's line and its *apparent echelon* advance must, I think, have been the result of his *right-oblique view* of the charge.

Colonel Taylor is again at fault when he says "the charge was made down a gentle slope, and then up to the enemy's lines, a distance of over half a mile, denuded of forests, and in full sight of the enemy and perfect range of their artillery. These combined causes produced their natural effect upon Pettigrew's division and the brigades supporting it—caused them to falter, and finally retire. Then Pickett's division, continuing the charge, without supports and in sight of the enemy, was not half so formidable or effective as it would have been had trees or hills prevented the enemy from so correctly estimating the strength of the attacking column, and our own troops from experiencing that sense of weakness which the known absence of support necessarily produced. In spite of all this it steadily and gallantly advanced to its allotted task." Why "*to falter and finally retire*," from the causes enumerated, should have been the "*natural effect*" upon Heth's division, under the noble and gallant Pettigrew, and Lane's and Scales' brigades, under that old hero Trimble, who lost a leg in the charge, and not upon Pickett's command, is something that I cannot comprehend. I *know*, however, *personally*, that my old brigade, in all its glorious achievements, never behaved more gallantly than on that terrible and bloody battle-field. As General Trimble says, "the truth is, Pickett's, Pettigrew's, and Trimble's divisions were literally shot to pieces, and the small remnants who broke the first Federal line were too feeble to hold what they had gained," and as he also adds, from *close personal observation*, "notwithstanding the losses as we advanced, the men (in Lane's and Scales' brigades) marched with the deliberation and accuracy of men on drill." In that much-talked-of and generally misunderstood charge, my brigade were as much the "heroes of Gettysburg" as *any other* troops that took part in it, and when we were driven back we were among the *first* to re-form, and we did so immediately in rear of the artillery, and not at the hospitals.

Yours, very respectfully,

JAMES H. LANE.

**Official Report of General Lane.****HEADQUARTER'S LANE'S BRIGADE,***August 13, 1863.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 1st July, we moved from South Mountain, Pennsylvania, through Cashtown in the direction of Gettysburg, and formed line of battle in rear of the left of Heth's division, about three miles from the latter place to the left of the turnpike, in the following order: Seventh, Thirty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Eighteenth, and Thirty-third North Carolina regiments—the right of the Seventh resting on the road. After marching nearly a mile in line of battle, we were ordered to the right of the road, and formed on the extreme right of the Light division. Here I ordered the Seventh regiment to deploy as a strong line of skirmishers some distance to my right and at right angles to our line of battle, to protect our flank, which was exposed to the enemy's cavalry; Pettigrew's and Archer's brigades were in the first line immediately in our front. We were soon ordered forward again after taking this position, the Seventh being instructed to move as skirmishers by the left flank. In advancing we gained ground to the right, and on emerging from the woods in which Pettigrew's brigade had been formed, I found that my line had passed Archer's, and that my entire front was unmasked. We then moved about a mile, and as the Seventh regiment had been detained a short time, Colonel Barbour threw out forty men under Captain Hudson, to keep back some of the enemy's cavalry which had dismounted, and were annoying us with an enfilade fire. We moved across this open field at quick time, until a body of the enemy's cavalry and a few infantry opened upon us from the woods, subsequently occupied by Pegram's battalion of artillery, when the men gave a yell and rushed forward at a double-quick—the whole of the enemy's force beating a hasty retreat to Cemetery Hill. My right now extended into the woods referred to, and my left was a short distance from the Fairfield road. On passing beyond the stone fence and into the peach orchard near McMillan's house, I was ordered by General Pender not to advance further unless there was another general forward movement. As I could see nothing at that time to indicate such

a movement, and as one of the enemy's batteries on Cemetery Hill was doing us some damage, I ordered the brigade back a few yards that the left might take shelter behind the stone fence. We remained in this position that night, and next day, before the heavy artillery-firing commenced, I ordered the Thirty-third and Eighteenth regiments to the left of Colonel Garnett's battalion of artillery, that they might be better sheltered, and at the same time be out of the enemy's line of fire. In the afternoon I was ordered by General Pender to take possession of the road in my front with my skirmishers, if possible. Fresh men were thrown forward, and the whole, under Major O. N. Brown, of the Thirty-seventh, executed the order very handsomely, driving the enemy's skirmishers and occupying the road along our entire front. With the exception of the gallantry displayed by our skirmishers, nothing of interest occurred in my command on the second day.

After a portion of the army on our right (I suppose they were some of Anderson's troops,) had driven the enemy some distance, General Pender rode from the left of my line to the right of his division. About sunset I was informed by Captain Norwood, of General Thomas' staff, that General Pender had been wounded, and that I must take command of the division and advance, if I saw a good opportunity for doing so. At that time the firing on the right was very desultory—the heavy fighting having ended.

I was soon afterwards informed by Major Whiting, of General Rodes' staff, that General Rodes would advance at dark, and that he wished me to protect his flank. I did not give him a definite answer then as I had sent you to notify General Hill of General Pender's fall, and to receive instructions. On being notified, however, by General Ewell, that his whole command would move on the enemy's position that night, commencing with Johnson's division on the left, I told Major Whiting that I would act without awaiting instructions from General Hill. I at once ordered forward Thomas' brigade and McGowan's, (then commanded by Col. Perrin,) to form an obtuse angle with Ramseur's brigade, which was the right of Rodes' first line, leaving an interval of one hundred paces. I, at the same time, determined to support these two brigades with Scales' and my own, commanded respectively by Colonels Lowrance and Avery, should there be any occasion for it. I subsequently received orders from General Hill, through Capt.

Starke, corresponding with what I had already done. Rodes' right advanced but a short distance beyond the road which was held by my skirmishers, when the night attack was abandoned, and Rodes' front line occupied the road—Thomas and Perrin extending the same with their commands, the right of Thomas' brigade resting a short distance from an orchard near a brick dwelling and barn.

Next morning the skirmishing was very heavy in front of Thomas and Perrin, requiring, at times, whole regiments to be deployed to resist the enemy and drive them back, which was always most gallantly done. While this was going on, I was ordered by General Hill, through Captain Hill, to move in person to the right with the two brigades forming my second line, and to "*report to General Longstreet as a support to Pettigrew.*" General Longstreet ordered me to form in rear of the right of Heth's division, commanded by General Pettigrew. Soon after I had executed this order, putting Lowrance on the right, I was relieved of the command of the division by Major-General Trimble, who acted under the same orders that I had received. Heth's division was much larger than Lowrance's brigade and my own, which were its only support, and there was consequently no second line in rear of its left.

Now, in command of my brigade, I moved forward to the support of Pettigrew's right, through the woods in which our batteries were planted, and through an open field about a mile in full view of the enemy's fortified position, and under a murderous artillery and infantry fire. As soon as Pettigrew's command gave back, Lowrance's brigade and my own, without ever having halted, took position on the left of the troops which were still contesting the ground with the enemy. My command never moved forward more handsomely. The men reserved their fire in accordance with orders, until within good range of the enemy, and then opened with telling effect, repeatedly driving the cannoners from their pieces—completely silencing the guns in our immediate front, and breaking the line of infantry which was formed on the crest of the hill. We advanced to within a few yards of the stone wall, exposed all the while to a heavy raking artillery fire from the right. My left was here very much exposed, and a column of infantry was thrown forward in that direction, which enfiladed my

whole line. This forced me to withdraw my brigade—the troops on my right having already done so. We fell back as well as could be expected, reformed immediately in rear of the artillery, as directed by General Trimble, and remained there until the following morning.

I cannot speak too highly of my brigade in this bloody engagement. Both officers and men moved forward with a heroism unsurpassed, giving the brigade-inspector and his rear guard nothing to do. Our great loss tells but too sadly of the gallant bearing of my command—six hundred and sixty (660) out of an effective total of thirteen hundred and fifty-five, (1,355) including ambulance corps and rear guard—our loss on the 1st and 2nd being but slight.\*

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\* General Trimble writes as follows of the third day's fight:

"On the morning of the 3d I had been put in command, by order of General Lee, of two of the brigades of General Pender, who had been wounded. These were both of North Carolina troops, commanded by J. H. Lane and Alfred M. Scales. On taking command of these troops, entire strangers to me, and wishing as far as I could to inspire them with confidence, I addressed them briefly—ordered that no gun should be fired until the enemy's line was broken, and that I should advance with them to the farthest point.

"When the charge commenced, about 3 P. M., I followed Pettigrew (Heth's division), about one hundred and fifty yards in rear—a sufficient distance to prevent the adverse fire raking both ranks as we marched down the slope. Notwithstanding the losses as we advanced, the men marched with the deliberation and accuracy of men on drill. I observed the same in Pettigrew's line. When the latter was within one hundred, or one hundred and fifty yards from the Emmettsburg road, they seemed to sink into the earth under the tempest of fire poured into them. We passed over the remnant of their line, and immediately after some one close by my left sung out, 'Three cheers for the Old North State,' when both brigades sent up a hearty shout, on which I said to my aid, 'Charley, I believe those fine fellows are going into the enemy's line.'

"They did get to the road, and drove the opposing line from it. They continued there some minutes, discharging their pieces at the enemy. The loss here was fearful, and I knew that no troops could long endure it. I was anxious to know how things went on with the troops on our right, and taking a quick but deliberate view of the field over which Pickett had advanced, I perceived that the enemy's fire seemed to slacken there, and men in squads were falling back on the west side of the Emmettsburg road. By this I inferred that Pickett's division had been repulsed, and, if so, that it would be a useless sacrifice of life to continue the contest. I therefore did not attempt to rally the men who begun to give back from the fence.

"As I followed the retiring line, on horseback at a walk, to the crest of Seminary Ridge, under the increasing discharge of grape, shell, and musketry, I had cause to wonder how ANY ONE could escape wounds or death.

"On reaching the summit of the ridge, I found the men had fallen into line behind some rude defences. I said, 'That is right, my brave fellows; stand your ground, and we will presently serve these chaps as they have us.' For, by all the rules of warfare, the Federal troops should (as I expected they would) have marched against our shattered columns, and sought to cover our army with an overwhelming defeat."

General Trimble being wounded, I was again thrown in command of the division, and with Lowrance's brigade and my own, under command of Colonel Avery, moved back to the rear of Thomas and Perrin on the 4th. There was skirmishing at intervals that day, and at dark we commenced falling back in the direction of Fairfield, Captain W. T. Nicholson, of the Thirty-seventh, being left in command of the skirmishers from my brigade.

We formed line of battle at Hagerstown, Md., on the 11th, and threw up breastworks along our entire front. Next day the Light division was consolidated with Heth's, and the whole being put under the command of General Heth, I again returned to the command of my brigade.

On the 13th we had one man killed in the works, and had twenty-seven (27) skirmishers captured. The skirmishers were taken by a body of the enemy that advanced from a point of woods under cover of stone fences and an orchard.

The retreat from Hagerstown the night of the 13th was even worse than that from Gettysburg. My whole command was so exhausted that they all fell asleep as soon as they were halted, about a mile from the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. Just as we were ordered to resume our march, the troops of Heth's division that occupied the breastworks in our rear as a rear-guard were attacked by the enemy's cavalry. I at once ordered my command to fix bayonets, as our guns were generally unloaded, and moved down the road after General Thomas, but was soon halted by General Heth's order, and subsequently made to take position in line of battle, to allow those brigades that were engaged to withdraw. I threw out a very strong line of skirmishers along our whole front, under Lieutenant Crowell of the Twenty-eighth, with instructions not to fire until the enemy got close upon him, and to fall back gradually when he saw the main line retiring towards the river. The Eighteenth regiment, under Col. Barry, was deployed to the right as skirmishers, and Colonel Avery had supervision of the right wing, so as to enable me to be apprised of the movements of the enemy more readily. As soon as the other brigades withdrew a large force moved to our right, and as our left was threatened, I lost no time in falling back, which was done in excellent order.

Our thanks are due to Lieutenant Crowell, and the officers and men under him, for the stubbornness with which they contested

every inch of ground against the enemy's mounted and dismounted cavalry, thereby enabling us to effect a crossing without the brigade's being engaged. Lieutenant Crowell's command was the last organized body to cross the bridge.

Our loss in bringing up the rear was six (6) wounded and thirty-eight (38) missing. Our entire loss in the "trans-Potomac" campaign was seven hundred and thirty-one (731).

Colonel Avery, of the Thirty-third, who continued at his post after he had been bruised by a shell, refrains from making special allusion to any one of his command, as they all gallantly discharged their duties.

Colonel Barbour, of the Thirty-seventh, refers to his heavy loss as sufficient evidence of the gallantry of his command. The loss of such officers as Lieutenants Doherty, Royster, Jno. P. Elms, and W. N. Michle, who nobly discharged their duties, will be seriously felt.

Colonel Barry, of the Eighteenth, is proud of his command, which acted throughout the campaign in a manner satisfactory to him and creditable to themselves.

Colonel Lowe, of the Twenty-eighth, was wounded and had to leave, but Lieutenant-Colonel Speer speaks in high terms of the bravery of his officers and men during the whole of that desperate and hard-fought battle. He alludes to Adjutant R. S. Folger as having acted with great gallantry throughout the engagements, and also to Captains Linebarger, Morrow, Randle and Smith, and Lieutenant Thompson, who were wounded while gallantly leading their companies to the charge.

Captain Turner, commanding the Seventh, was wounded in front of his command, while gallantly leading it forward, and was left on the field. Captain Harris then assumed command, and is well pleased with the gallant bearing of the old Seventh, which was surpassed by none.

My aid, Lieutenant Oscar Lane, and my two couriers, Geo. E. Barringer and A. R. Joyce, privates from the Twenty-eighth, were very efficient, both on the march and in action, and again bore themselves well under fire.

Respectfully,

JAMES H. LANE, *Brig.-General.*

Major JOS. A. ENGELHARD,

*Assist.-Adjutant-General Pender's Light Division.*



**Letter from Colonel J. B. Walton.**

NEW ORLEANS, October 15th, 1877.

Rev. J. WM. JONES, D. D.,

*Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va.:*

DEAR SIR: My attention has been directed to the letter of Col. E. P. Alexander, of date of 17th March, 1877, on the subject of "Causes of Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg," published in the September No. of *Southern Historical Society Papers*, in which occurs the following statement by Colonel Alexander: "My rank and position during that campaign was colonel of artillery, commanding a battalion of six batteries attached as reserve to Longstreet's corps; and on the field at Gettysburg, I was placed by Gen. Longstreet in command of all his artillery on the field, as chief of artillery for the action."

I am at a loss to comprehend how it could be stated by Colonel Alexander that he was "placed by General Longstreet in command of all his artillery on the field as chief of artillery for the action" at Gettysburg, for I had been for more than a year before, was during the battle and after the battle of Gettysburg, Chief of Artillery of the First Army Corps, under Lieutenant-General Longstreet, and caused all the batteries in the grand bombardment of the 3d July to be placed in position from right to left, placing the Washington Artillery, under Major Eshleman, in the centre as nearly as could be. During the entire engagement I was present in person on the field, directing and superintending the batteries in action. Colonel Alexander commanded one of the battalions, composed of six batteries of the First corps; all the artillery of that corps being under my command, as chief of artillery, commanding.

On the 20th June, 1862, General Order No. 28, right wing Army Northern Virginia, I was announced as follows:

Colonel J. B. Walton, of the battalion Washington Artillery, having reported for duty with this command, he is announced as Chief of Artillery. He will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

By command of Major-General Longstreet.

G. M. SORREL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

And on the 15th August, 1862, the following order was published to battery commanders:

HEADQUARTERS, TAYLOR'S HOUSE,  
NEAR GORDONSVILLE, August 15th, 1862.

*General Order No. 32.*

II. Colonel J. B. Walton, of the battalion Washington Artillery, is announced as Chief of Artillery of this command, and will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

III. Battery commanders will report to him without delay, to be disposed of in such camp or camps as may be selected; making their regular reports to him, for consolidation and transmission to this office.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of Major-General Longstreet.

G. M. SORREL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

*To Colonel J. B. WALTON, Commanding, &c.*

And on the 4th June, 1863 (one month before the battle of Gettysburg), after the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia had been reorganized by battalions and assigned to the three corps of the army, General Lee announced the appointments of commanders of the artillery of the several corps as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
June 4th, 1863.

*Extract Special Order No. 151.*

In accordance with the recommendation of the Chief of Artillery, made under par. II of General Order No. 69, current series, from these headquarters, the following-named officers are assigned to the command of the artillery under the recent organization: Colonel J. B. Walton, of the First corps; Colonel V. Crutchfield, of the Second corps; Colonel R. L. Walker, of the Third corps.

By command of General Lee.

W. H. TAYLOR,  
*Assistant-Adjutant General.*

*To Colonel J. B. WALTON.*

On the 23d June, 1863, General Longstreet directed to "Col. J. B. Walton, Chief of Artillery First corps, commanding," the following, as the order of march for Hagerstown *via* Berryville:

1st. Pickett's division.

2d. Walton's *Reserve* Artillery (Alexander and Washington Artillery).

3d. Hood's division.  
4th. McLaws' division.

During the march to Hagerstown, Md., and thence to Gettysburg, all orders from General Lee or General Longstreet were communicated to me officially as Chief of Artillery, First corps.

On the night of the 30th June, I encamped near Greenwood, on the road to Gettysburg, with the two battalions composing the reserve artillery of the artillery of the First corps of the army—Alexander's battalion and the Washington Artillery. It had rained all day in torrents, greatly impeding our progress, and in consequence, the two battalions were not as well advanced as they otherwise would have been. We remained halted at Greenwood all day of the first of July.

At about ten o'clock at night, July 1st, a courier came to my camp and delivered to me the following, from General Longstreet's headquarters :

HEADQUARTERS, NEAR GETTYSBURG, PA.,  
*July 1st, 5:30 P. M., 1863.*

COLONEL: The Commanding-General desires you to come on to-night as far as you can, without distressing your men and animals. Ewell and Hill have sharply engaged the enemy to-day, and you will be wanted for to-morrow's battle. The action to-day has been vigorous and successful. The enemy was driven two or three miles and out of Gettysburg, without hesitation. General Rodes now occupies the town. The enemy's loss in prisoners and casualties considerable—ours light. Major-General Heth wounded, not dangerously.

I am, very respectfully,  
G. M. SORREL, *Assist.-Adjt.-General.*

*To Colonel J. B. WALTON,*  
*Chief Artillery, Commanding.*

The following is Adjutant W. M. Owen's statement of what was done from the moment of the receipt of the note above recited until the two battalions reported on the field on the morning of the 2d July :

I carried the order to Colonel Alexander, commanding one of the battalions of artillery attached to the reserve, (all under Col. Walton, chief of artillery,) at about 10:30 to 11 o'clock, at night. At 12 o'clock Alexander's battalion and the Washington Artillery were stretched out on the road to Gettysburg. A long delay then occurred in starting, on account of an immense wagon-train pass-

ing, said to belong to Johnson's division. At 2:30 A. M., July 2d, we took the road, (both battalions,) and by an easy march reached the neighborhood of Gettysburg about sun-up; halting in an open field, the command got breakfast, and I was sent to report the presence of the artillery reserve of Longstreet's corps on the field and ready for battle. I found General Longstreet on Seminary Hill with General Lee and Generals Heth and A. P. Hill, and Doctors Cullen and Maury, surgeons. Upon making my report, Gen. Longstreet ordered that the battalions be kept where they were until further orders.

On the morning of the third of July, at day-light, the batteries of the First corps were all in position, extending from Hood, in front of the "Round Top," to and beyond the peach orchard. At this point General Longstreet sent for me, accompanied by Adjutant Owen. I rode to the rear of the line, where we found Gen. Longstreet in consultation with the general officers. He gave me then my final instructions, and informed me of the plan of battle. At a given signal, to be arranged by myself, all the guns on the line were to open simultaneously on the enemy's batteries. The signal fixed was two guns in quick succession by the Washington Artillery. Upon returning to the front I dispatched Adjutant Owen along the entire line, to notify each of the artillery commanders, and to give them their orders, which he did and returned to me.

It was understood that Colonel Alexander had been charged with the duty of observing the effect of the fire of the batteries upon the enemy's lines, and to give the signal for General Pickett to advance to the assault.

Everything was in readiness—no firing on either side—when, at a few minutes after one o'clock, P. M., while in rear of the Washington Artillery, near the peach orchard, I received by a courier, the following in General Longstreet's hand-writing.

HEADQUARTERS, IN THE FIELD,  
July 3d, 1863.

COLONEL: Let the batteries open. Order great care and precision in firing. If the batteries at the peach orchard cannot be used against the point we intend attacking, let them open upon the rocky hill.

Most respectfully,

J. LONGSTREET,  
Lieutenant-General Commanding.

To Colonel WALTON.

Major Eshleman, in command of the Washington Artillery, was ordered to fire the signal gun, when instantly from the right to the extreme left of the line, as had been arranged by order of General Longstreet, the guns of every battery opened the tremendous cannonade.

On the 4th of July, at 1 o'clock A. M., I received the following, addressed to me as Chief of Artillery, First corps: "General Longstreet directs that you have your artillery in readiness to resist an attack by daylight, remembering you have no ammunition to spare except for the enemy's infantry," etc., and the following order before day on the 4th July:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,

*July 4th, 1863.*

COLONEL: The Lieutenant-General directs that such of your wagons as can be spared from your command be sent to Cashtown during the day as quietly as possible, reporting to Colonel Corley and Major Mitchell about dark. Let there be as little confusion as possible. Have the wagons which are to accompany the troops parked on the Fairfield road, so that they can file in with the column as it passes.

*Will you please send Colonel Alexander to see the General at this point at light.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

OSMAN LATROBE,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

*To Colonel WALTON, Commanding Artillery, &c.*

Enough has been written to show that Colonel Alexander has made a mistake in the assertion that he was in command of *all the artillery* of the First corps on the field, "as chief of artillery for the action." Certainly, I was chief of artillery of the First corps before the action, commanded in the action directly under General Longstreet's orders on the field, fired the signal guns, as agreed with General Longstreet, to commence the bombardment, and I never was relieved from nor did I at any time relinquish my command of all the artillery of the First corps, until long after General Longstreet was ordered to Tennessee; and I was subsequently appointed by the Secretary of War, "Inspector-General of Field Artillery," in March or April, 1864.

I really regret that, in justice to myself and to the responsible, and I may say distinguished position, I had the honor to fill at the

battle of Gettysburg, I find myself compelled, for the first time since the war, to present myself in print.

If my poor services on that sanguinary and trying field were of any value or of any merit, such as they were, I have the pride to wish to preserve the record of them as dear to me and to my friends.

Your obedient servant,

J. B. WALTON,  
*Late Chief of Artillery, First Corps, A. N. V., Comd'g.*

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**Letter from General Longstreet.**

GAINESVILLE GA., *November 6th, 1877.*

Colonel J. B. WALTON, *New Orleans:*

MY DEAR SIR: I find in my account of Gettysburg just published, ambiguous remarks about our artillery officers.

The paragraph beginning "Our artillery," etc., should read: On the 2d, Colonel Alexander's battalion being at the head of the column, he was ordered to assign the batteries to positions and to general supervision, pending the absence of Colonel Walton, chief of artillery.

On the 3rd, Colonel Alexander being an officer of unusual promptness, sagacity, and intelligence, and being more familiar with the ground to be occupied by the artillery, was directed to see that the batteries were posted to the best advantage.

I beg to assure you that the idea of interfering with your prerogatives, or authority or fitness for your position, did not enter my mind. Your duties were such as to take you away from headquarters, and often render it difficult to find you just at the right moment, particularly when the entire corps was not together, as was the case on the 2d.

On the 3rd, Colonel Alexander's special service, after seeing that the batteries were most advantageously posted, was to see that field artillery was ready to move with General Pickett's assault, and to give me the benefit of his judgment as to the moment the effect of the artillery combat would justify the assault.

I regard Colonel Alexander's position on the 3d *as that of an engineer staff officer*, more than one exercising any authority in a manner calculated to place you in an improper light.

My account of Gettysburg was put together rapidly, to meet the call of the newspapers, as you will see. Supposing that I should review it after it was copied, I had made a note of explanation of the apparent anomalous position of artillery officers; but the papers were sent to press before I had an opportunity to read and correct this point.

I remain, very truly yours,

JAMES LONGSTREET.



**General James Longstreet's Account of the Campaign and Battle.**

[The following paper is not properly one of our "Gettysburg Series," and was not called forth by our enquiry for detailed narratives by active participants, nor by anything which we have published.

In the early part of last year the *Philadelphia Times* announced that it had engaged General Longstreet to prepare his account of Gettysburg, and his article appeared in that paper on the 3d of November last. But we have no hesitancy in republishing the paper, although it was not written for our pages, and we are under no obligation to *copy* an article which has first appeared elsewhere. General Longstreet's position as second in command at Gettysburg, the important part he bore in the great battle, his unquestioned gallantry, and the fact that he commanded as noble a corps as ever fought for any cause—all demand that, in addition to his official report (which our Society published for the first time), we shall put into permanent form the narrative which he now gives of these great events. We, therefore, print the paper in full.]

It has been my purpose for some years to give to the public a detailed history of the campaign of Gettysburg, from its inception to its disastrous close. The execution of this task has been delayed by reason of a press of personal business, and by reason of a genuine reluctance that I have felt against anything that might, even by implication, impugn the wisdom of my late comrades in arms. My sincere feeling upon this subject is best expressed in the following letter, which was written shortly after the battle of Gettysburg, when there was a sly under-current of misrepresentation of my course, and in response to an appeal from a respected relative that I would make some reply to my accusers:

CAMP, CULPEPER COURTHOUSE,  
July 24, 1863.

MY DEAR UNCLE: Your letters of the 13th and 14th were received on yesterday. As to our late battle, I cannot say much. I have no right to say anything, in fact, but will venture a little for you alone. If it goes to aunt and cousins, it must be under promise that it will go no further. The battle was not made as I would have made it. My idea was to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us. So far as is given to man the ability

to judge, we may say with confidence that we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into Washington, and dictated our terms, or, at least, held Washington and marched over as much of Pennsylvania as we cared to, had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carefully chosen position in his rear. General Lee chose the plans adopted; and he is the person appointed to choose and to order. I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the Commanding-General. If he approves and adopts them, it is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views, and to execute his orders as faithfully as if they were my own. I cannot help but think that great results would have been obtained had my views been thought better of; yet I am much inclined to accept the present condition as for the best. I hope and trust that it is so. Your programme would all be well enough, had it been practicable; and was duly thought of, too. I fancy that no good ideas upon that campaign will be mentioned at any time that did not receive their share of consideration by General Lee. The few things that he might have overlooked himself were, I believe, suggested by myself. As we failed, I must take my share of the responsibility. In fact, I would prefer that all the blame should rest upon me. As General Lee is our commander, he should have the support and influence we can give him. If the blame (if there is any) can be shifted from him to me, I shall help him and our cause by taking it. I desire, therefore, that all the responsibility that can be put upon me shall go there and shall remain there. The truth will be known in time, and I leave that to show how much of the responsibility of Gettysburg rests on my shoulders. \* \* \*

Most affectionately yours,

J. LONGSTREET.

To A. B. LONGSTREET, LL. D., *Columbus, Ga.*

I sincerely regret that I cannot still rest upon that letter. But I have been so repeatedly and so rancorously assailed by those whose intimacy with the Commanding-General in that battle gave an apparent importance to their assaults, that I feel impelled by a sense of duty to give to the public a full and comprehensive narration of the campaign from its beginning to its end; especially when I reflect that the publication of the truth cannot now, as it might have done then, injure the cause for which we fought the battle. The request that I furnish this history to the *Times* comes opportunely, for the appeal just made through the press by a distinguished foreigner for all information that will develop the causes of the failure of that campaign has provoked anew its partisan and desultory discussion, and renders a plain and logical recital of the facts both timely and important.

After the defeat of Burnside at Fredericksburg in December, it was believed that active operations were over for the winter, and I was sent

with two divisions of my corps to the eastern shore of Virginia, where I could find food for my men during the winter, and send supplies to the Army of Northern Virginia. I spent several months in this department, keeping the enemy close within his fortifications, and foraging with little trouble and great success. On May 1st I received orders to report to General Lee, at Fredericksburg. General Hooker had begun to throw his army across the Rappahannock, and the active campaign was opening. I left Suffolk as soon as possible, and hurried my troops forward. Passing through Richmond, I called to pay my respects to Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War. Mr. Seddon was at the time of my visit deeply considering the critical condition of Pemberton's army at Vicksburg, around which Gen. Grant was then decisively drawing his lines. He informed me that he had in contemplation a plan for concentrating a succoring army at Jackson, Miss., under the command of General Johnston, with a view of driving Grant from before Vicksburg by a direct issue at arms. He suggested that possibly my corps might be needed to make the army strong enough to handle Grant, and asked me my views. I replied that there was a better plan, in my judgment, for relieving Vicksburg than by a direct assault upon Grant. I proposed that the army then concentrating at Jackson, Miss., be moved swiftly to Tullahoma, where General Bragg was then located with a fine army, confronting an army of about equal strength, under General Rosecranz, and that at the same time the two divisions of my corps be hurried forward to the same point. The simultaneous arrival of these reinforcements would give us a grand army at Tullahoma. With this army General Johnston might speedily crush Rosecranz, and that he should then turn his force toward the north, and with his splendid army march through Tennessee and Kentucky, and threaten the invasion of Ohio. My idea was, that in the march through those States the army would meet no organized obstruction; would be supplied with provisions, and even reinforcements, by those friendly to our cause, and would inevitably result in drawing Grant's army from Vicksburg to look after and protect his own territory. Mr. Seddon adhered to his original views; not so much, I think, from his great confidence in them as from the difficulty of withdrawing the force suggested from General Lee's army. I was very thoroughly impressed with the practicability of the plan, however, and when I reached General Lee I laid it before him with the freedom justified by our close personal and official relations. The idea seemed to be a new one to him, but he was evidently seriously impressed with it. We discussed it over and over, and I discovered that his main objection to it was that it would, if adopted, force him to divide his army. He left no room to doubt, however, that he believed the idea of an offensive campaign was not only important but necessary.

At length, while we were discussing the idea of a western forward movement, he asked me if I did not think an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania by his own army would accomplish the same result, and I replied that I did not see that it would, because this movement would be too hazardous, and the campaign in thoroughly Union States would require more time and greater preparation than one through Tennessee and Kentucky. I soon discovered that he had determined that he would make some forward movement, and I finally assented that the Pennsylvania campaign might be brought to a successful issue if he could make it offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics. This point was urged with great persistency. I suggested that, after piercing Pennsylvania and menacing Washington, we should choose a strong position and force the Federals to attack us, observing that the popular clamor throughout the North would speedily force the Federal General to attempt to drive us out. I recalled to him the battle of Fredericksburg as an instance of a defensive battle, when, with a few thousand men, we hurled the whole Federal army back, crippling and demoralizing it, with trifling loss to our own troops; and Chancellorsville as an instance of an offensive battle, where we dislodged the Federals, it is true, but at such a terrible sacrifice that half a dozen such victories would have ruined us. It will be remembered that Stonewall Jackson once said that "we sometimes fail to drive the enemy from a position; they always fail to drive us." I reminded him, too, of Napoleon's advice to Marmont, to whom he said, when putting him at the head of an invading army, "Select your ground and make your enemy attack you." I recall these points simply because I desire to have it distinctly understood that, while I first suggested to General Lee the idea of an offensive campaign, I was never persuaded to yield my argument against the Gettysburg campaign, except with the understanding that we were not to deliver an offensive battle, but to so manoeuvre that the enemy should be forced to attack us—or, to repeat, that our campaign should be one of offensive strategy, but defensive tactics. Upon this understanding my assent was given, and General Lee, who had been kind enough to discuss the matter with me patiently, gave the order of march.

The movement was begun on the 3d of June. McLaws' division of my corps moved out of Fredericksburg for Culpeper Courthouse, followed by Ewell's corps on the 4th and 5th of June. Hood's division and Stuart's cavalry moved at the same time. On the 8th we found two full corps (for Pickett's division had joined me then) and Stuart's cavalry concentrated at Culpeper Courthouse. In the meantime a large force of the Federals, cavalry and infantry, had been thrown across the Rappahannock and sent to attack General Stuart. They were encountered at Brandy Station on the morning of the 9th, and repulsed. General Lee

says of this engagement: "On the 9th a large force of Federal cavalry, strongly supported by infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly's Ford and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, when the enemy was forced to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving four hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery, and several colors in our hands." The failure of General Lee to follow up his advantage, by pouring the heavy force concentrated at Culpeper Courthouse upon this detachment of the Federals, confirmed my convictions that he had determined to make a defensive battle, and would not allow any casual advantage to precipitate a general engagement. If he had had any idea of abandoning the original plan of a tactical defensive, then, in my judgment, was the time to have done so. While at Culpeper, I sent a trusty scout (who had been sent to me by Secretary Seddon while I was at Suffolk) with instructions to go into the Federal lines, discover his policy, and bring me all the information he could possibly pick up. When this scout asked me, very significantly, where he should report, I replied: "Find me, wherever I am, when you have the desired information." I did this because I feared to trust him with a knowledge of our future movements. I supplied him with all the gold he needed, and instructed him to spare neither pains nor money to obtain full and accurate information. The information gathered by this scout led to the most tremendous results, as will soon be seen.

General A. P. Hill, having left Fredericksburg as soon as the enemy had retired from his front, was sent to follow Ewell, who had marched up the Valley and cleared it of the Federals. My corps left Culpeper on the 15th, and, with a view of covering the march of Hill and Ewell through the Valley, moved along the east side of the Blue Ridge and occupied Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, and the line of the Blue Ridge. General Stuart was in my front and on my flank, reconnoitering the movements of the Federals. When it was found that Hooker did not intend to attack, I withdrew to the west side and marched to the Potomac. As I was leaving the Blue Ridge, I instructed General Stuart to follow me, and to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, while I crossed at Williamsport, ten miles above. In reply to these instructions, Gen. Stuart informed me that he had discretionary powers; whereupon I withdrew. General Stuart held the Gap for awhile, and then hurried around beyond Hooker's army, and we saw nothing more of him until the evening of the 2d of July, when he came down from York and joined us, having made a complete circuit of the Federal army. The absence of Stuart's cavalry from the main body of the army during the march is claimed to have been a fatal error, as General Lee says: "No report had been received (on the 27th) that the enemy had crossed the Potomac,

and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information." The army, therefore, moved forward as a man might walk over strange ground with his eyes shut. General Lee says of his orders to Stuart: "General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains and to observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harrass and impede as much as possible, should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event, General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the Potomac on the east or west of the Blue Ridge, as in his judgment should be best, and take position on the right of our column as it advanced."

My corps crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and General A. P. Hill crossed at Shepherdstown. Our columns were joined together at Hagerstown, and we marched thence into Pennsylvania, reaching Chambersburg on the evening of the 27th. At this point, on the night of the 29th, information was received by which the whole plan of the campaign was changed. We had not heard from the enemy for several days, and Gen. Lee was in doubt as to where he was; indeed, we did not know that he had yet left Virginia. At about 10 o'clock that night Colonel Sorrell, my chief-of-staff, was waked by an orderly, who reported that a suspicious person had just been arrested by the provost-marshal. Upon investigation, Sorrell discovered that the suspicious person was the scout, Harrison, that I had sent out at Culpeper. He was dirt-stained, travel-worn, and very much broken down. After questioning him sufficiently to find that he brought very important information, Colonel Sorrell brought him to my headquarters and awoke me. He gave the information that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, marched northwest, and that the head of his column was at Frederick City, on our right. I felt that this information was exceedingly important, and might involve a change in the direction of our march. General Lee had already issued orders that we were to advance toward Harrisburg. The next morning I at once sent the scout to General Lee's headquarters, and followed him myself early in the morning. I found General Lee up, and asked him if the information brought by the scout might not involve a change of direction of the head of our column to the right. He immediately acquiesced in the suggestion, possibly saying that he had already given orders to that effect. The movement toward the enemy was begun at once. Hill marched toward Gettysburg, and my corps followed, with the exception of Pickett's division, which was left at Chambersburg by General Lee's orders. Ewell was recalled from above—he having advanced as far as Carlisle. I was with General Lee most of that day (the 30th). At about noon the road in front of my corps was blocked by Hill's corps and Ewell's wagon train, which had cut into the road from above. The orders were to allow these trains to precede us, and that we should go into camp at Green-

wood, about ten miles from Chambersburg. My infantry was forced to remain in Greenwood until late in the afternoon of the 1st. My artillery did not get the road until 2 o'clock on the morning of the 2d.

General Lee spent the night with us, establishing his headquarters, as he frequently did, a short distance from mine. General Lee says of the movements of this day: "Preparation had been made to advance upon Harrisburg; but on the night of the 29th information was received from a scout that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of his column had already reached South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains." On the morning of the 1st General Lee and myself left his headquarters together, and had ridden three or four miles when we heard heavy firing along Hill's front. The firing became so heavy that General Lee left me and hurried forward to see what it meant. After attending to some details of my march, I followed. The firing proceeded from the engagement between our advance and Reynolds' corps, in which the Federals were repulsed. This rencontre was totally unexpected on both sides. As an evidence of the doubt in which General Lee was enveloped, and the anxiety that weighed him down during the afternoon, I quote from General R. H. Anderson the report of a conversation had with him during the engagement. General Anderson was resting with his division at Cashtown, awaiting orders. About 10 o'clock in the morning he received a message notifying him that General Lee desired to see him. He found Gen. Lee intently listening to the fire of the guns, and very much disturbed and depressed. At length he said, more to himself than to General Anderson: "I cannot think what has become of Stuart; I ought to have heard from him long before now. He may have met with disaster, but I hope not. In the absence of reports from him, I am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. It may be the whole Federal army, or it may be only a detachment. If it is the whole Federal force we must fight a battle here; if we do not gain a victory those defiles and gorges through which we passed this morning will shelter us from disaster."

When I overtook General Lee at 5 o'clock that afternoon, he said, to my surprise, that he thought of attacking General Meade upon the heights the next day. I suggested that this course seemed to be at variance with the plan of the campaign that had been agreed upon before leaving Fredericksburg. He said: "If the enemy is there to-morrow, we must attack him." I replied: If he is there, it will be because he is anxious that we should attack him—a good reason in my judgment for not doing so." I urged that we should move around by our right to the left of Meade and put our army between him and Washington, threatening



his left and rear, and thus force him to attack us in such position as we might select. I said that it seemed to me that if, during our council at Fredericksburg, we had described the position in which we desired to get the two armies, we could not have expected to get the enemy in a better position for us than that he then occupied. I said, further, that he was in strong position and would be awaiting us, which was evidence that he desired that we should attack him. I said, further, that his weak point seemed to be his left; hence I thought that we should move around to his left, that we might threaten it if we intended to manœuvre, or attack it if we were determined upon a battle. I called his attention to the fact that the country was admirably adapted for a defensive battle, and that we should surely repulse Meade with crushing loss if we would take position so as to force him to attack us, and suggested that even if we carried the heights in front of us, and drove Meade out, we should be so badly crippled that we could not reap the fruits of victory; and that the heights of Gettysburg were in themselves of no more importance to us than the ground we then occupied, and that the mere possession of the ground was not worth a hundred men to us. That Meade's army, not its position, was our objective. General Lee was impressed with the idea that by attacking the Federals he could whip them in detail. I reminded him that if the Federals were there in the morning it would be proof that they had their forces well in hand, and that with Pickett in Chambersburg and Stuart out of reach, we should be somewhat in detail. He, however, did not seem to abandon the idea of attack on the next day. He seemed under a subdued excitement which occasionally took possession of him when "the hunt was up," and threatened his superb equipoise. The sharp battle fought by Hill and Ewell on that day had given him a taste of victory. Upon this point I quote General Fitzhugh Lee, who says, speaking of the attack on the 3d: "He told the father of the writer (his brother) that he was controlled too far by the great confidence he felt in the fighting qualities of his people, who begged simply to be 'turned loose,' and by the assurances of most of his higher officers." I left General Lee quite late on the night of the 1st. Speaking of the battle on the 2d, General Lee says in his official report: "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base unless attacked by the enemy; but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains."

When I left General Lee on the night of the 1st, I believed he had made up his mind to attack, but was confident that he had not yet determined as to when the attack should be made. The assertion first made by General Pendleton, and echoed by his confederates, that I was ordered to open the attack at sunrise, is totally false. Documentary testimony

upon this point will be presented in the course of this article. Suffice it to say at present that General Lee never in his life gave me orders to open an attack at a specific hour. He was perfectly satisfied that when I had my troops in position and was ordered to attack, no time was ever lost. On the night of the 1st I left him without any orders at all. On the morning of the 2d I went to General Lee's headquarters at daylight and renewed my views against making an attack. He seemed resolved, however, and we discussed the probable results. He observed the position of the Federals and got a general idea of the nature of the ground. About sunrise General Lee sent Colonel Venable, of his staff, to General Ewell's headquarters, ordering him to make a reconnoissance of the ground in his front, with a view of making the main attack on his left. A short time afterwards he followed Colonel Venable in person. He returned at about 9 o'clock and informed me that it would not do to have Ewell to open the attack. He finally determined that I should make the main attack on the extreme right. It was fully 11 o'clock when General Lee arrived at this conclusion and ordered the movement. In the meantime, by General Lee's authority, Law's brigade, which had been put upon picket duty, was ordered to rejoin my command, and upon my suggestion that it would be better to await its arrival, General Lee assented. We awaited about forty minutes for these troops and then moved forward. A delay of several hours occurred in the march of the troops. The cause of this delay was that we had been ordered by General Lee to proceed cautiously upon the forward movement so as to avoid being seen by the enemy. General Lee ordered Colonel Johnson, of his engineer corps, to lead and conduct the head of the column. My troops, therefore, moved forward under guidance of a special officer of General Lee, and with instructions to follow his directions. I left General Lee only after the line was stretched out on the march, and rode along with Hood's division, which was in the rear. The march was necessarily slow, the conductor frequently encountering points that exposed the troops to the view of the signal station on Round Top. At length the column halted. After waiting some time, supposing that it would soon move forward, I sent to the front to inquire the occasion of the delay. It was reported that the column was awaiting the movements of Colonel Johnston, who was trying to lead it by some route by which it could pursue its march without falling under view of the Federal signal station. Looking up toward Round Top I saw that the signal station was in full view, and, as we could plainly see this station, it was apparent that our heavy columns was seen from their position, and that further efforts to conceal ourselves would be a waste of time.

I became very impatient at this delay, and determined to take upon myself the responsibility of hurrying the troops forward. I did not order

General McLaws forward because, as the head of the column, he had direct orders from General Lee to follow the conduct of Colonel Johnson.

Therefore I sent orders to Hood, who was in the rear and not encumbered by these instructions, to push his division forward by the most direct route so as to take position on my right. He did so, and thus broke up the delay. The troops were rapidly thrown into position and preparations were made for the attack. It may be proper just here to consider the relative strength and position of the two armies. Our army was 52,000 infantry, Meade's was 95,000; these are our highest figures and the enemy's lowest. We had learned on the night of the 1st, from some prisoners captured near Seminary Ridge, that the First, Eleventh, and Third corps had arrived by the Emmettsburg road and had taken position on the heights in front of us, and that reinforcements had been seen coming by the Baltimore road just after the fight of the 1st. From an intercepted dispatch we learned that another corps was in camp about four miles from the field. We had every reason, therefore, to believe that the Federals were prepared to renew the battle. Our army was stretched in an elliptical curve, reaching from the front of Round Top around Seminary Ridge, and enveloping Cemetery Heights on the left; thus covering a space of four or five miles. The enemy occupied the high ground in front of us, being massed within a curve of about two miles, nearly concentric with the curve described by our forces. His line was about 1,400 yards from ours. Any one will see that the proposition for this inferior force to assault and drive out the masses of troops upon the heights was a very problematical one. My orders from General Lee were "to envelop the enemy's left and begin the attack there, following up as near as possible the direction of the Emmetsburg road."

My corps occupied our right, with Hood on our extreme right and McLaws next. Hill's corps was next to mine, in front of the Federal centre, and Ewell was on our extreme left. My corps, with Pickett's division absent, numbered hardly 13,000 men. I realized that the fight was to be a fearful one; but being assured that my flank would be protected by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, Wright, Posey, and Mahone moving *en echelon*, and that Ewell was to co-operate by a direct attack on the enemy's right, and Hill to threaten his centre and attack if opportunity offered and thus prevent reinforcements from being launched either against myself or Ewell, it seemed that we might possibly dislodge the great army in front of us. At half-past 3 o'clock the order was given General Hood to advance upon the enemy, and, hurrying to the head of McLaws's division, I moved with his line. Then was fairly commenced what I do not hesitate to pronounce the best three hours' fighting ever done by any troops on any battle-field. Directly in front of us, occupying the peach orchard, on a piece of elevated ground that General Lee desired

me to take and hold for his artillery, was the Third corps of the Federals, commanded by General Sickles. My men charged with great spirit and dislodged the Federals from the peach orchard with but little delay, though they fought stubbornly. We were then on the crest of Seminary Ridge. The artillery was brought forward and put into position at the peach orchard. The infantry swept down the slope and soon reached the marshy ground that lay between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges, fighting their way over every foot of ground and against overwhelming odds; at every step we found that reinforcements were pouring into the Federals from every side. Nothing could stop my men, however, and they commenced their heroic charge up the side of Cemetery Ridge. Our attack was to progress in the general direction of the Emmetsburg road, but the Federal troops, as they were forced from point to point, availing themselves of the stone fences and boulders near the mountain as rallying points, so annoyed our right flank that General Hood's division was obliged to make a partial change of front so as to relieve itself of this galling flank fire. This drew General McLaws a little further to the right than General Lee had anticipated, so that the defensive advantages of the ground had enabled the Federals to delay our purposes until they could occupy Little Round-Top, which they just then discovered was the key to their position. The force thrown upon this point was so strong as to seize our right, as it were, in a vise.

Still the battle on our main line continued to progress. The situation was a critical one. My corps had been fighting over an hour, having encountered and driven back line after line of the enemy. In front of them was a high and rugged ridge, on its crest the bulk of the Army of the Potomac, numbering six to one, and securely resting behind strong positions. My brave fellows never hesitated, however. Their duty was in front of them and they met it. They charged up the hill in splendid style, sweeping everything before them, dislodging the enemy in the face of a withering fire. When they had fairly started up the second ridge, I discovered that they were suffering terribly from a fire that swept over their right and left flanks. I also found that my left flank was not protected by the brigades that were to move *en echelon* with it. McLaws' line was consequently spread out to the left to protect its flank, and Hood's line was extended to the right to protect its flank from the sweeping fire of the large bodies of troops that were posted on Round Top.\* These

\*The importance of Round Top as a *point d'appui* was not appreciated until after my attack. General Meade seems to have alluded to it as a point to be occupied "if practicable," but in such slighting manner as to show that he did not deem it of great importance. So it was occupied by an inadequate force. As our battle progressed, pushing the Federals back from point to point, subordinate officers and soldiers, seeking shelter, as birds flying to cover in a tempest, found behind the large boulders of its rock-bound sides not only protection, but rallying points. These reinforcements to the troops already there, checked our advance on the right, and some superior officer arriving just then, divined from effect the cause, and threw a force into Round Top that transformed it, as if by magic, into a Gibraltar.

two movements of extension so drew my forces out that I found myself attacking Cemetery Hill with a single line of battle against not less than 50,000 troops.

My two divisions at that time were cut down to eight or nine thousand men, four thousand having been killed or wounded. We felt at every step the heavy stroke of fresh troops—the sturdy regular blow that tells a soldier instantly that he has encountered reserves or reinforcements. We received no support at all, and there was no evidence of co-operation on any side. To urge my men forward under these circumstances would have been madness, and I withdrew them in good order to the peach orchard that we had taken from the Federals early in the afternoon. It may be mentioned here as illustrative of the dauntless spirit of these men, that when General Humphreys (of Mississippi) was ordered to withdraw his troops from the charge, he thought there was some mistake, and retired to a captured battery near the swale between the two ridges, where he halted, and when ordered to retire to the new line a second time, he did so under protest.\* Our men had no thought of retreat. They broke every line they encountered. When the order to withdraw was given a courier was sent to General Lee informing him of the result of the day's work.

Before pursuing this narrative further, I shall say a word or two concerning this assault. I am satisfied that my force, numbering hardly 13,000 men, encountered during that three and a half hours of bloody work not less than 65,000 of the Federals, and yet their charge was not checked nor their line broken until we ordered them to withdraw. Mr. Whitelaw Reid, writing a most excellent account of this charge to the *Cincinnati Gazette*, says: "It was believed from the terrific attack that the whole rebel army, Ewell's corps included, was massed on our centre and left, and so a single brigade was left to hold the rifle-pits on the right and the rest hurried across the little neck of land to strengthen our weakening lines." He describes, too, the haste with which corps after corps was hurried forward to the left to check the advance of my two-thirds of one corps. General Meade himself testifies (see his official report) that the Third, the Second, the Fifth, the Sixth, and the Eleventh corps, all of the Twelfth except one brigade and part of the First corps, engaged my handful of heroes during that glorious but disastrous afternoon. I found that night that 4,529 of my men, more than one-third of their total number, had been left on the field. History records no parallel to the fight made by these two divisions on the 2d of July at Gettysburg. I cannot

\*The troops engaged with me in the fight of the 2d were mostly Georgians, as follows: The four Georgia brigades of Generals Benning, Anderson, Wofford and Semmes, General Kershaw's South Carolina brigade, General Laws' Alabama brigade, General Barksdale's (afterward General Humphrey's) Mississippi brigade, and General Robertson's Texas brigade.

refrain from inserting just here an account of the battle of the 2d taken from a graphic account in the *New York World*. It will be seen that the correspondent treats the charge of my 13,000 men as if it were the charge of the whole army. The account is as follows:

"He then began a heavy fire on Cemetery Hill. It must not be thought that this wrathful fire was unanswered. Our artillery began to play within a few moments, and hurled back defiance and like destruction upon the rebel lines. Until 6 o'clock the roar of cannon, the rush of missiles and the bursting of bombs filled all the air. The clangor alone of this awful combat might well have confused and awed a less cool and watchful commander than General Meade. It did not confuse him. With the calculation of a tactician and the eye of an experienced judge, he watched from his headquarters on the hill whatever movement under the murky cloud which enveloped the rebel lines might first disclose the intention which it was evident this artillery firing covered. About 6 o'clock, P. M., silence, deep, awfully impressive but momentary, was permitted, as if by magic, to dwell upon the field. Only the groans—unheard before—of the wounded and dying, only a murmur, a warning memory of the breeze through the foliage; only a low rattle of preparation of what was to come embroidered this blank stillness. Then, as the smoke beyond the village was lightly borne to the eastward, the woods on the left were seen filled with dark masses of infantry, three columns deep, who advanced at a quick step. Magnificent! Such a charge by such a force—full forty-five thousand men, under Hill and Longstreet—even though it threatened to pierce and annihilate the Third corps, against which it was directed, drew forth cries of admiration from all who beheld it. General Sickles and his splendid command withstood the shock with a determination that checked but could not fully restrain it. Back, inch by inch, fighting, falling, dying, cheering, the men retired. The rebels came on more furiously, halting at intervals, pouring volleys that struck our troops down in scores. General Sickles, fighting desperately, was struck in the leg and fell. The Second corps came to the aid of his decimated column. The battle then grew fearful. Standing firmly up against the storm, our troops, though still outnumbered, gave back shot for shot, volley for volley, almost death for death. Still the enemy was not restrained. Down he came upon our left with a momentum that nothing could check. The rifled guns that lay before our infantry on a knoll were in danger of capture. General Hancock was wounded in the thigh, General Gibbon in the shoulder. The Fifth corps, as the First and Second wavered anew, went into the breach with such shouts and such volleys as made the rebel column tremble at last. Up from the valley behind another battery came rolling to the heights, and flung its contents in an instant down in the midst of the enemy's ranks. Crash! crash! with discharges deafening, terrible, the musketry firing went on. The enemy, reforming after each discharge with wondrous celerity and firmness, still pressed up the declivity. What hideous carnage filled the minutes between the appearance of the Fifth corps and the advance to the support of the rebel columns of still another column from the right, I cannot bear to tell. Men fell, as the leaves fall in autumn, before those horrible discharges. Faltering for an instant the rebel columns seemed about to recede before the tempest. But their officers, who could be seen through the smoke of the conflict galloping and swinging their swords along the lines, rallied them anew, and the next instant the whole line sprang forward, as if to break through our own by mere weight of num-

bers. A division from the Twelfth corps, on the extreme right, reached the scene at this instant, and at the same time Sedgwick came up with the Sixth corps, having finished a march of nearly thirty-six consecutive hours. To what rescue they came their officers saw and told them. Weary as they were, barefooted, hungry, fit to drop for slumber, as they were, the wish for victory was so blended with the thought of exhaustion that they cast themselves, in turn, en masse into line of battle, and went down on the enemy with death in their weapons and cheers on their lips. The rebel's camel's back was broken by this "feather." His line staggered, reeled and drifted slowly back, while the shouts of our soldiers, lifted up amid the roar of musketry over the bodies of the dead and wounded, proclaimed the completeness of their victory."

It may be imagined that I was astonished at the fact that we received no support after we had driven the Federals from the peach orchard and one thousand yards beyond. If General Ewell had engaged the army in his front at that time (say 4 o'clock) he would have prevented their massing their whole army in my front, and while he and I kept their two wings engaged Hill would have found their centre weak, and should have threatened it while I broke through their left and dislodged them. Having failed to move at 4 o'clock, while the enemy was in his front, it was still more surprising that he did not advance at 5 o'clock with vigor and promptness, when the trenches in front of him were vacated or rather held by one single brigade (as General Meade's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War states). Had he taken these trenches and scattered the brigade that held them, he would have found himself in the Federals' flank and rear. His attack in the rear must have dislodged the Federals, as it would have been totally unexpected—it being believed that he was in front with me. Hill charging upon the centre at the same time would have increased their disorder and we should have won the field. But Ewell did not advance until I had withdrawn my troops, and the First corps, after winning position after position, was forced to withdraw from the field with two corps of their comrades within sight and resting upon their arms. Ewell did not move until about dusk (according to his own report). He then occupied the trenches that the enemy had vacated (see General Meade's report). The real cause of Ewell's non-compliance with General Lee's orders was that he had broken his line of battle by sending two brigades off on some duty up the York road. General Early says that my failure to attack at sunrise was the cause of Ewell's line being broken at the time I did attack. This is not only absurd but impossible. After sunrise that morning Colonel Venable and General Lee were at Ewell's headquarters discussing the policy of opening the attack with Ewell's corps. They left Ewell with this definite order: that he was to hold himself in readiness to support my attack when it was made. It is silly to say that he was ready at sunrise, when



he was not ready at 4 o'clock when the attack was really made. His orders were to hold himself in readiness to co-operate with my attack when it was made. In breaking his line of battle he rendered himself unable to support me when he would have been potential. Touching the failure of the supporting brigades of Anderson's division to cover McLaws' flank by *echelon* movements, as directed, there is little to be said. Those brigades acted gallantly, but went astray early in the fight. General Anderson in his report says: "A strong fire was poured upon our right flank, which had become detached from McLaws' left." General Lee, alluding to the action of these two brigades, says: "But having become separated from McLaws, Wilcox's and Wright's brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines of the enemy's infantry and compelling him to abandon much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the foot and Wright gained the crest of the ridge itself, driving the enemy down the opposite side; but having become separated from McLaws, and gone beyond the other two brigades of the division they were to attack in front and on both flanks, and compelled to retire, being unable to bring off any of the captured artillery, McLaws' left also fell back, and it being now nearly dark General Longstreet determined to await the arrival of Pickett." So much for the action of the first day.

I did not see General Lee that night. On the next morning he came to see me, and fearing that he was still in his disposition to attack, I tried to anticipate him by saying: "General, I have had my scouts out all night, and I find that you still have an excellent opportunity to move around to the right of Meade's army and manœuvre him into attacking us." He replied, pointing with his fist at Cemetery Hill: "The enemy is there, and I am going to strike him." I felt then that it was my duty to express my convictions; I said: "General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions and armies, and should know as well as any one what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position," pointing to Cemetery Hill. General Lee in reply to this ordered me to prepare Pickett's division for the attack. I should not have been so urgent had I not foreseen the hopelessness of the proposed assault. I felt that I must say a word against the sacrifice of my men; and then I felt that my record was such that General Lee would or could not misconstrue my motives. I said no more, however, but turned away. The most of the morning was consumed in waiting for Pickett's men and getting into position. The plan of assault was as follows: Our artillery was to be massed in a wood from which Pickett was to charge, and it was to pour a continuous fire upon the cemetery. Under cover of this fire, and supported by it, Pickett was to charge.

Our artillery was in charge of General E. P. Alexander, a brave and gifted officer. Colonel Walton was my chief of artillery, but Alexander being at the head of the column, and being first in position, and being besides an officer of unusual promptness, sagacity and intelligence, was given charge of the artillery. The arrangements were completed about one o'clock. General Alexander had arranged that a battery of seven 11-pound howitzers, with fresh horses and full caissons, were to charge with Pickett, at the head of his line, but General Pendleton, from whom the guns had been borrowed, recalled them just before the charge was made, and thus deranged this wise plan. Never was I so depressed as upon that day. I felt that my men were to be sacrificed, and that I should have to order them to make a hopeless charge. I had instructed General Alexander, being unwillingly to trust myself with the entire responsibility, to carefully observe the effect of the fire upon the enemy, and when it began to tell to notify Pickett to begin the assault. I was so much impressed with the hopelessness of the charge that I wrote the following note to General Alexander: "If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our efforts pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise General Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let Pickett know when the moment offers."

To my note the General replied as follows: "I will only be able to judge the effect of our fire upon the enemy by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed to view, and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer from your note, there is an alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it will take all of the artillery ammunition we have left to test this one thoroughly, and if the result is unfavorable, we will have none left for another effort, and even if this is entirely successful it can only be so at a very bloody cost." I still desired to save my men and felt that if the artillery did not produce the desired effect I would be justified in holding Pickett off. I wrote this note to Colonel Walton at exactly 1:30 P. M.: "Let the batteries open. Order great precision in firing. If the batteries at the peach orchard cannot be used against the point we intend attacking, let them open on the enemy at Rocky Hill." The cannonading which opened along both lines was grand. In a few moments a courier brought a note to General Pickett (who was standing near me) from Alexander, which, after reading, he handed to me. It was as follows: "If you are coming at all you must come at once, or I cannot give you proper support; but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all; at least eighteen guns are still firing from the Cemetery itself." After I had read the note Pickett said to me: "General, shall I advance?" My feel-

ings had so overcome me that I would not speak for fear of betraying my want of confidence to him. I bowed affirmation and turned to mount my horse. Pickett immediately said: "I shall lead my division forward, sir." I spurred my horse to the wood where Alexander was stationed with artillery. When I reached him he told me of the disappearance of the seven guns which were to have led the charge with Pickett, and that his ammunition was so low that he could not properly support the charge. I at once ordered him to stop Pickett until the ammunition had been replenished. He informed me that he had no ammunition with which to replenish. I then saw that there was no help for it, and that Pickett must advance under his orders. He swept past our artillery in splendid style, and the men marched steadily and compactly down the slope. As they started up the ridge over one hundred cannon from the breastworks of the Federals hurled a rain of cannister, grape and shell down upon them; still they pressed on until half way up the slope, when the crest of the hill was lit with a solid sheet of flame as the masses of infantry rose and fired. When the smoke cleared away Pickett's division was gone. Nearly two-thirds of his men lay dead on the field, and the survivors were sullenly retreating down the hill. Mortal man could not have stood that fire. In half an hour the contested field was cleared and the battle of Gettysburg was over.

When this charge had failed I expected that of course the enemy would throw himself against our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I sent my staff officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of batteries as the only support that I could give them, knowing that my presence would impress upon every one of them the necessity of holding the ground to the last extremity. I knew if the army was to be saved those batteries must check the enemy. As I rode along the line of artillery I observed my old friend Captain Miller, Washington Artillery, of Sharpsburg record, walking between his guns and smoking his pipe as quietly and contentedly as he could at his camp-fire. The enemy's skirmishers were then advancing and threatening assault. For unaccountable reasons the enemy did not pursue his advantage. Our army was soon in compact shape, and its face turned once more toward Virginia. I may mention here that it has been absurdly said that General Lee ordered me to put Hood's and McLaws' divisions in support of Pickett's assault. General Lee never ordered any such thing.\* After our troops were all arranged for assault General Lee rode

\* Colonel Taylor says that General Lee, in his presence, gave me orders to put Hood's and McLaws' divisions in this column of attack. This I deny, and do not suppose he will claim that any one else heard the order. If the reader will examine any of the maps of Gettysburg he will see that the withdrawal of these two divisions from their line of battle would have left half of General Lee's line of battle open and by the shortest route to his line of supplies and retreat. Fully one-half of his army would have been in the column of assault

with me twice over the lines to see that everything was arranged according to his wishes. He was told that we had been more particular in giving the orders than ever before; that the commanders had been sent for and the point of attack had been carefully designated, and that the commanders had been directed to communicate to their subordinates, and through them to every soldier in the command, the work that was before them, so that they should nerve themselves for the attack and fully understand it. After leaving me he again rode over the field once, if not twice, so that there was really no room for misconstruction or misunderstanding of his wishes. He could not have thought of giving any such an order. Hood and McLaws were confronted by a largely superior force of the enemy on the right of Pickett's attack. To have moved them to Pickett's support would have disengaged treble their number of Federals, who would have swooped down from their rocky fastnesses against the flank of our attacking column and swept our army from the field. A reference to any of the maps of Gettysburg will show from the position of the troops that this would have been the inevitable result. General Lee and myself never had any deliberate conversation about Gettysburg. The subject was never broached by either of us to the other. On one occasion it came up casually and he said to me (alluding to the charge of Pickett on the 3d), "General, why didn't you stop all that thing that day." I replied that I could not under the circumstances assume such a responsibility, as no discretion had been left me.

Before discussing the weak points of the campaign of Gettysburg, it is proper that I should say that I do so with the greatest affection for General Lee and the greatest reverence for his memory. The relations existing between us were affectionate, confidential, and even tender, from first to last. There was never a harsh word between us. It is then with a reluctant spirit that I write a calm and critical review of the Gettysburg campaign, because that review will show that our Commanding-General was unfortunate at several points. There is no doubt that General Lee, during the crisis of that campaign, lost the matchless equipoise that

and half of Meade's army would have been free to sally out on the flank of our column and we should have been destroyed on that field of battle beyond a doubt. Of course, if we assume that Meade would place his army in line of battle and allow us to select our point of attack, we could have massed against it and rushed through. But this assumption would be absurd. The only way for those divisions to have been moved was to have attacked the heights in front. But this attack had been tried and failed the day before. If Pickett had shown signs of getting a lodgment, I should, of course, have pushed the other divisions forward to support the attack. But I saw that he was going to pieces at once. When Colonel Freemantle (Her Majesty's service) approached me (see his account) and congratulated me on Pickett's apparent success, I told him that his line would break in a moment—that he was not strong enough to make a serious impression. My assertion was correct. To have rushed forward my two divisions, then carrying bloody noses from their terrible conflict the day before, would have been madness.

usually characterized him, and that whatever mistakes were made were not so much matters of deliberate judgment as the impulses of a great mind disturbed by unparalleled conditions. General Lee was thrown from his balance (as is shown by the statement of General Fitzhugh Lee) by too great confidence in the prowess of his troops and (as is shown by General Anderson's statement) by the deplorable absence of General Stuart and the perplexity occasioned thereby. With this preface I proceed to say that the Gettysburg campaign was weak in these points—adhering, however, to my opinion that a combined movement against Rosecranz in Tennessee and a march toward Cincinnati would have given better results than could possibly have been secured by the invasion of Pennsylvania: First, the offensive strategical but defensive tactical plan of the campaign as agreed upon should never have been abandoned after we entered the enemy's country. Second, if there ever was a time when the abandonment of that plan could have promised decisive results, it was at Brandy Station, where, after Stuart had repulsed the force thrown across the river, we might have fallen on that force and crushed it, and then put ourselves in position, threatening the enemy's right and rear, which would have dislodged him from his position at Fredericksburg and given us the opportunity for an effective blow. Third, General Stuart should not have been permitted to leave the general line of march, thus forcing us to march blindfolded into the enemy's country; to this may be attributed, in my opinion, the change of the policy of the campaign. Fourth, the success obtained by the accidental rencontre on the 1st should have been vigorously prosecuted and the enemy should have been given no time to fortify or concentrate. Fifth, on the night of the 1st the army should have been carried around to Meade's right and rear, and posted between him and his capitol, and we could have manœvered him into an attack. Sixth, when the attack was made on the enemy's left on the 2d by my corps, Ewell should have been required to co-operate by a vigorous movement against his right and Hill should have moved against his centre. Had this been done his army would have been dislodged beyond question. Seventh, on the morning of the 3d it was not yet too late to move to the right and manœuver the Federals into attacking us. Eighth, Pickett's division should not have been ordered to assault Cemetery Ridge on the 3d, as we had already tested the strength of that position sufficiently to admonish us that we could not dislodge him. While the co-operation of Generals Ewell and Hill, on the 2d, by vigorous assault at the moment my battle was in progress, would in all probability have dislodged the Federals from their position, it does not seem that such success would have yielded the fruits anticipated at the inception of the campaign. The battle as it was fought would, in any result, have so crippled us that the Federals would have been able to

make good their retreat, and we should soon have been obliged to retire to Virginia with nothing but victory to cover our waning cause.

The morale of the victory might have dispirited the North and aroused the South to new exertions, but it would have been nothing in the game being played by the two armies at Gettysburg. As to the abandonment of the tactical defensive policy that we had agreed upon, there can be no doubt that General Lee deeply deplored it as a mistake. His remark, made just after the battle, "It is all my fault," meant just what it said. It adds to the nobility and magnanimity of that remark when we reflect that it was the utterance of a deep-felt truth rather than a mere sentiment. In a letter written to me by General Lee in January, 1864, he says: "Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg instead of pursuing the course I did, how different all might have been." Captain T. J. Gorie, of Houston, Texas, a gentleman of high position and undoubted integrity, writes to me upon this same point as follows: "Another important circumstance which I distinctly remember was in the winter of 1864, when you sent me from East Tennessee to Orange Courthouse with dispatches for General Lee. Upon my arrival there General Lee asked me in his tent, where he was alone with two or three Northern papers on his table. He remarked that he had just been reading the Northern official report of the Battle of Gettysburg; that he had become satisfied from reading those reports that if he had permitted you to carry out your plans on the third day, instead of making the attack on Cemetery Hill, we would have been successful." I cannot see, as has been claimed, why the absence of General Lee's cavalry should have justified his attack on the enemy. On the contrary, while they may have perplexed him, I hold that it was additional reason for his not hazarding an attack. At the time the attack was ordered we were fearful that our cavalry had been destroyed. In case of a disaster, and a forced retreat, we should have had nothing to cover our retreat. When so much was at stake as at Gettysburg the absence of the cavalry should have prevented the taking of any chances.

As to the failure of Stuart to move with the army to the west side of the Blue Ridge, I can only call attention to the fact that General Lee gave him discretionary orders. He doubtless did as he thought best. Had no discretion been given him he would have known and fallen into his natural position—my right flank. But authority thus given a subordinate general implies an opinion on the part of the commander that something better than the drudgery of a march along our flank might be open to him, and one of General Stuart's activity and gallantry should not be expected to fail to seek it. As to Ewell's failure to prosecute the advantage won on the 1st, there is little to be said, as the Commanding-General was on the field. I merely quote from his (General Ewell's)

official report. He says: "The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position that was known to us as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town I received a message from the Commanding-General to attack the hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it; all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson was close to the town with his division, the only one of my corps that had not been engaged, Anderson's division of the Third corps, having been halted to let them pass. Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined with Johnson's division to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up the Federals were reported moving to our left flank—our extreme left—and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction. Before this report could be investigated by Lieutenant T. T. Turner, of my staff, and Lieutenant Robert Early, sent to investigate it, and Johnson placed in position, the night was far advanced." General Lee explains his failure to send positive orders to Ewell to follow up the flying enemy as follows: "The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops. Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and in the meantime every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and positions of the enemy and find the most favorable point to attack."

Pursuit "pell-mell" is sometimes justified in a mere retreat. It is the accepted principle of action in a rout. General Early, in his report of this day's work, says "the enemy had been routed." He should, therefore, have been followed by everything that could have been thrown upon his heels, not so much to gain the heights, which were recognized as the rallying point, but to prevent his rallying at all in time to form lines for another battle. If the enemy had been routed this could and should have been done. In the "Military Annals of Louisiana," (Napier Bartlett, Esq.,) in the account of this rout, he says: "Hays had received orders through Early from General Ewell (though Lee's general instructions were subsequently the reverse) to halt at Gettysburg and advance no further in case he should succeed in capturing that place. But Hays now saw that the enemy were coming around by what is known as the Baltimore road, and were making for the heights—the Cemetery Ridge. This ridge meant life or death, and for the possession of it the battles of the 2d and 3d were fought. \* \* \* \* Owing to the long detour the enemy was compelled to make, it was obvious that he could not get his artillery in position on the heights for one or two hours. The immediate occupation of the heights by the Confederates, who were in position to get them at the time referred to, was a matter of vital importance.



Hays recognized it as such and presently sent for Early. The latter thought as Hays, but declined to disobey orders. At the urgent request of General Hays, however, he sent for General Ewell. When the latter arrived many precious moments had been lost. But the enemy, who did not see its value until the arrival of Hancock, had not yet appeared in force." General Hays told me ten years after the battle that he "could have seized the heights without the loss of ten men." Here we see General Early adhering to orders when his own convictions told him he should not do so, and refusing to allow General Hays to seize a point recognized by him as of vast importance, because of technical authority, at a moment when he admitted and knew that disregard of the order would only have made more secure the point at issue when the order was given.

Before closing this article I desire to settle finally and fully one point concerning which there has been much discussion, viz: the alleged delay in the attack upon the 2d. I am moved to this task not so much by an ambition to dissolve the cloud of personal misrepresentation that has been settled about my head, as by a sense of duty which leads me to determine a point that will be of value to the historian. It was asserted by General Pendleton, with whom the carefulness of statement or deliberateness of judgment has never been a characteristic, but who has been distinguished for the unreliability of his memory, that General Lee ordered me to attack the enemy at sunrise on the 2d. General J. A. Early has, in positive terms, indorsed this charge, which I now proceed to disprove. I have said that I left General Lee late in the night of the 1st, and that he had not then determined when the attack should be made; that I went to his headquarters early the next morning and was with him for some time; that he left me early after sunrise and went to Ewell's headquarters with the express view of seeing whether or not the main attack should be made then, and that he returned at about 9 o'clock; and that after discussing the ground for some time he determined that I should make the main attack, and at 11 o'clock gave me the order to prepare for it. I now present documents that sustain these assertions.

The first letter that I offer is from Colonel W. H. Taylor, of General Lee's staff. It is as follows:

"NORFOLK, VA., April 28, 1875.

"DEAR GENERAL: I have received your letter of the 20th instant. I have not read the article of which you speak, nor have I ever seen any copy of General Pendleton's address; indeed, I have read little or nothing of what has been written since the war. In the first place, because I could not spare the time; and in the second, of those of whose writings I have heard I deem but very few entitled to any attention whatever. I can only say that I never before heard of 'the sunrise attack' you were to have made as charged by General Pendleton. If such an order was

given you I never knew of it, or it has strangely escaped my memory. I think it more than probable that if General Lee had had your troops available the evening previous to the day of which you speak, he would have ordered an early attack, but this does not touch the point at issue. I regard it as a great mistake on the part of those who, perhaps, because of political differences, now undertake to criticise and attack your war record. Such conduct is most ungenerous, and I am sure meets the disapprobation of all good Confederates with whom I have had the pleasure of associating in the daily walks of life.

"Yours, very respectfully, W. H. TAYLOR.

"To General LONGSTREET."

The next letter is from Colonel Charles Marshall, of General Lee's staff, who has charge of all the papers left by General Lee. It is as follows:

"BALTIMORE, MD., May 7, 1875.

"DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 20th ult. was received and should have had an earlier reply but for my engagements preventing me from looking at my papers to find what I could on the subject. I have no personal recollection of the order to which you refer. It certainly was not conveyed by me, nor is there anything in General Lee's official report to show the attack on the 2d was expected by him to begin earlier, except that he notices that there was not proper concert of action on that day.

"Respectfully,

CHARLES MARSHALL.

"To General LONGSTREET, New Orleans."

Then a letter from General A. L. Long, who was General Lee's military secretary:

"BIG ISLAND, BEDFORD, VA., May 31, 1875.

"DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 20th ult., referring to an assertion of General Pendleton's, made in a lecture delivered several years ago, which was recently published in the *Southern Historical Society Magazine* substantially as follows: 'That General Lee ordered General Longstreet to attack General Meade at sunrise on the morning of the 2d of July,' has been received. I do not recollect of hearing of an order to attack at sunrise, or at any other designated hour, pending the operations at Gettysburg during the first three days of July, 1863. \* \* \*

"Yours truly,

A. L. LONG.

"To General LONGSTREET."

I add the letter of Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, which should of itself be conclusive. I merely premise it with the statement that it was fully 9 o'clock before General Lee returned from his reconnoissance of Ewell's lines:

"UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, May 11, 1875.

General JAMES LONGSTREET:

DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 25th ultimo. with regard to Gen. Lee's battle order on the 1st and 2d of July at Gettysburg, was duly received. I did not know of any order for attack on the enemy at sunrise on the 2d, nor can I believe any such order was issued by General Lee. About sunrise on the 2d of July I was sent by General Lee to General Ewell to ask him what he thought of the advantages of an attack on the enemy from his position. (Colonel Marshall had been sent with a simi-

lar order on the night of the 1st). General Ewell made me ride with him from point to point of his lines, so as to see with him the exact position of things. Before he got through the examination of the enemy's position General Lee came himself to General Ewell's lines. In sending the message to General Ewell, General Lee was explicit in saying that the question was whether he should move all the troops around on the right and attack on that side. I do not think that the errand on which I was sent by the Commanding-General is consistent with the idea of an attack at sunrise by any portion of the army.

Yours, very truly,  
CHAS. S. VENABLE."

I add upon this point the letter of Dr. Cullen, medical director of the First corps:

"RICHMOND, VA., May 18, 1875.

General JAMES LONGSTREET:

DEAR GENERAL—Yours of the 16th ult. should have received my immediate attention, but before answering it I was desirous of refreshing my memory of the scenes and incidents of the Gettysburg campaign by conversation with others who were with us and who served in different corps of the command. It was an astounding announcement to the survivors of the First army corps that the disaster and failure at Gettysburg was alone and solely due to its commander, and that had he obeyed the orders of the commander-in-chief that Meade's army would have been beaten, before its entire force had assembled, and its final discomfiture thereby made certain. It is a little strange that these charges were not made while General Lee was alive to substantiate or disprove them, and that seven years or more were permitted to pass by in silence regarding them. You are fortunate in being able to call upon the Adjutant-General and the two confidential officers of General Lee's staff for their testimony in the case, and I do not think that you will have any reason to fear their evidence. They knew every order that was issued for that battle, when and where attacks were to be made, who were slow in attacking, and who did not make attacks that were expected to be made. I hope, for the sake of history and for your brave military record, that a quietus will at once be put on this subject. I distinctly remember the appearance in our headquarter camp of the scout who brought from Frederick the first account that General Lee had of the definite whereabouts of the enemy; of the excitement at General Lee's headquarters among couriers, quartermasters, commissaries, etc., all betokening some early movement of the commands dependent upon the news brought by the scout. That afternoon General Lee was walking with some of us in the road in front of his headquarters and said: 'To-morrow, gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg as we expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade is after.' Orders had then been issued to the corps to move at sunrise on the morning of the next day, and promptly at that time the corps was put on the road. The troops moved slowly a short distance when they were stopped by Ewell's wagon trains and Johnson's division turning into the road in front of them, making their way from some point north to Cashtown or Gettysburg. How many hours we were detained I am unable to say, but it must have been many, for I remember eating a lunch or dinner before moving again. Being anxious to see you I rode rapidly by the troops (who, as soon as they could get into the road, pushed hurriedly by us also), and overtook you about dark at the hill this side of Gettysburg, about half a mile from the

town. You had been at the front with General Lee and were returning to your camp, a mile or two back. I spoke very exultingly of the victory we were thought to have obtained that day, but was surprised to find that you did not take the same cheerful view of it that I did, and presently you remarked that it would have been better had we not fought than to have left undone what we did. You said that the enemy were left occupying a position that it would take the whole army to drive them from and then at a great sacrifice. We soon reached the camp, three miles, perhaps, from Gettysburg, and found the column near by. Orders were issued to be ready to march at 'daybreak,' or some earlier hour, next morning. About 3 o'clock in the morning, while the stars were shining, you left your headquarters and rode to General Lee's, where I found you sitting with him *after sunrise* looking at the enemy on Cemetery Hill. I rode then into Gettysburg and was gone some two hours, and when I returned found you still with General Lee. At 2 or 3 o'clock in the day I rode with you toward the right, when you were about to attack, and was with you in front of the peach orchard when Hood began to move towards Round Top. General Hood was soon wounded and I removed him from the field to a house near by. \* \* \* \*

I am yours, very truly,

J. S. D. CULLEN."

I submit next an extract from the official report of General R. H. Anderson:

"Upon approaching Gettysburg I was directed to occupy the position in line of battle which had first been vacated by Pender's division, and to place one brigade and battery of artillery a mile or more on the right. Wilcox's brigade and Captain Ross' battery, of Lane's battalion, were posted in the detached position, while the other brigades occupied the the ground from which Pender's division had first been moved. We continued in position until the morning of the 2d, when I received orders to take up a new line of battle on the right of Pender's division, about a mile and a half further forward. In taking the new position the Tenth Alabama regiment, Wilcox's brigade, had a sharp skirmish with the body of the enemy who had occupied a wooded hill on the extreme right of my line. \* \* \* Shortly after the line had been formed I received notice that Lieutenant-General Longstreet would occupy the ground on my right, and that his line would be in a direction nearly at right angles with mine, and that he would assault the extreme left of the enemy and drive him toward Gettysburg."

From a narrative of General McLaws, published in 1873, I copy the following:

"On the 30th of June, I had been directed to have my division in readiness to follow General Ewell's corps. Marching toward Gettysburg, which it was intimated we would have passed by 10 o'clock the next day (the first of July), my division was accordingly marched from its camp and lined along the road in the order of march by 8 o'clock the 1st of July. When the troops of Ewell's corps—it was Johnston's division in charge of Ewell's wagon trains, which were coming from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains—had passed the head of my column, I asked General Longstreet's staff officer, Major Fairfax, if my division should follow. He went off to enquire, and returned with orders for me to wait

until Ewell's wagon train had passed, which did not happen until after 4 o'clock P. M. The train was calculated to be fourteen miles long, when I took up the line of march and continued marching until I arrived within three miles of Gettysburg, where my command camped along a creek. This was far into the night. My division was leading Longstreet's corps, and of course the other divisions come up later. I saw Hood's division the next morning, and understood that Pickett had been detached to guard the rear. While on the march, at about 10 o'clock at night, I met General Longstreet and some of his staff coming from the direction of Gettysburg, and had a few moments conversation with him. He said nothing of having received an order to attack at daylight the next morning. Here I will state that until General Pendleton mentioned it about two years ago when he was on a lecturing tour, after the death of General Lee, I never heard it intimated even that any such order had ever been given."

I close the testimony on this point by an extract from a letter from General Hood. He writes:

"I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, when the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of the same morning, we were both engaged in company with Generals A. P. Hill and Lee in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee, with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre belt around his waist and field glasses pending at his side, walked up and down in the shade of large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet at times buried in deep thought. Colonel Freemantle, of England, was esconced in the forks of a tree not far off with glasses in constant use examining the lofty position of the Federal army. General Lee was seemingly anxious that you should attack that morning. He remarked to me: 'The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him he will whip us.' You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett's division, at that time still in the rear, in order to make the attack, and you said to me subsequently, while we were seated together near the trunk of a tree: 'General Lee is a little nervous this morning. He wishes me to attack. I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into a battle with one boot off.'"

Having thus disproved the assertions of Messrs. Pendleton and Early in regard to this rumored order for a sunrise attack, it appears that they are worthy of no further recognition; but it is difficult to pass beyond them without noting the manner in which, by their ignorance, they marred the plans of their chief on the field of battle. Mr. Pendleton robbed Pickett's division of its most important adjunct, fresh field artillery, at the moment of its severest trial, and thus frustrated the wise and brilliant programme of assault planned by General Alexander, and without the knowledge of that officer. (See narrative of General Alexander in the *Southern Historical Papers* for September, 1877.] General Early broke up General Lee's line of battle on the 2d of July by detaching

part of his division on some uncalled-for service, in violation of General Lee's orders, and thus prevented the co-operative attack of Ewell ordered by General Lee.

It is proper to discuss briefly, at this point, the movements of the third day. The charge of that day as made by General Pickett was emphatically a forlorn hope. The point designated by General Lee as the point of attack seemed to be about one mile from where he and I stood when he gave his orders. I asked him if the distance that we had to overcome under a terrific fire was not more than a mile. He replied: "No; it is not more than fourteen hundred yards." So that our troops, when they arose above the crest, had to advance this distance under the fire of about half of the Federal army, before they could fire a shot. Anything less than thirty thousand fresh veterans would have been vainly sacrificed in this attempt. The force given me for this work was Pickett's division (or rather a part of it), about 5,500 men, fresh and ready to undertake anything. My supporting force of probably 8,000 men had bloody noses and bruised heads from the fight of the previous day, and were not in physical condition to undertake such desperate work. When fresh they were the equals of any troops on earth; but every soldier knows that there is a great difference between fresh soldiers and those who have just come out of a heavy battle. It has been charged that the delay of the attack on the third was the cause of the failure of Ewell to co-operate with Pickett's attack. Colonel Taylor says that Ewell was ordered to attack at the same time with me, mine being the main attack. He says:

"General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as soon as was expected. \* \* \* General Ewell, who had orders to co-operate with General Longstreet, and who was, of course, not aware of any impediment to the main attack, having reinforced General Johnson during the night of the 2d, ordered him forward early the next morning. In obedience to these instructions, General Johnson became hotly engaged before General Ewell could be informed of the halt that had been called upon our right."

Let us look at the facts of this. Instead of "making this attack at daylight," General Ewell says: "Just before the time fixed for General Johnson's advance the enemy attacked him to regain the works captured by Stuart the evening before." General Meade in his official report, says: "On the morning of the 3d, General Geary, having returned during the night, attacked at early dawn the enemy, and succeeded in driving him back and reoccupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained along this portion of the line all the morning, and General Geary, reinforced by Wharton's brigade of the Sixth corps, maintained his position and inflicted very severe loss upon the enemy." Now to return to my end of the line. At about sunrise General Lee came to

me and informed that General Pickett would soon report to me, and then ordered that his troops were to be used as a column of assault, designating the point of assault, and that portions of the Third corps were to be used in support. About 7 o'clock General Pickett rode forward and stated that his troops would soon be upon the field and asked to be assigned his position. Colonel W. W. Wood, of Pickett's division, in his account of the day, says: "If I remember correctly, Pickett's division and the artillery were all in position by 11 A. M." Hence we see that General Geary attacked General Ewell at least one hour before I had received my orders for the day; that at the very moment of my receiving these instructions General Ewell was engaged in a "spirited contest;" that this contest had continued several hours before General Pickett's troops came upon the field, and that the contest was virtually over before General Pickett and the artillery were prepared for the battle. When these arrangements were completed and the batteries ordered to open, General Ewell had been driven from his position and not a foot-step was made from any other part of the army in my support. That there may have been confusion of orders on the field during the second and third days I am not prepared to deny, but there was nothing of the kind about the headquarters of the First corps.

General Wilcox steps forward as a willing witness in all concerning the battle of Gettysburg, and seems to know everything of General Lee's wishes and the movements of the First corps, and in fact everything else except his own orders. His brigade was the directing brigade for the *echelon* movement that was to protect McLaws' flank. He went astray at the opening of the fight, either through ignorance of his orders or a misapprehension or violation of them. Had he but attended to his own brigade instead of looking to the management of the general battle, the splendid exhibition of soldiery given by his men would have given better results.

I have not seen the criticism of the Comte de Paris upon the campaign, but I gather from quotations that he adduced as one of the objections to the invasion of Pennsylvania that the Federals would do superior fighting upon their own soil. The Confederates, whom I have read after, deny that this is true. Although not technically correct the Comte is right in the material point. The actual fighting on the field of Gettysburg by the army of the Potomac was not marked by any unusual gallantry, but the positions that it occupied were held with much more than the usual tenacity of purpose.

There is little to say of the retreat of General Lee's army to the Potomac. When we reached South Mountain, on our retreat, we learned that the Federal cavalry was in strong force threatening the destruction of our trains then collecting at Williamsport, and that it was also inter-



cepting our trains on the road and burning some of our wagons. Upon the receipt of this intelligence, General Lee ordered me to march as rapidly as possible to the relief of our trains. By a forced march we succeeded in clearing the road and reached Williamsport in time to save our supply trains. We then took position covering the crossing there and at Falling Water, a short distance below. As the other corps arrived they were assigned positions and we went to work, as rapidly as possible to strengthen our line with field-works. On the 13th General Lee informed me that the river had fallen sufficiently at Williamsport to allow us to ford, and that the bridge at Falling Water had been repaired, and that he would that night recross the river with his entire army. I suggested as a matter of convenience and to avoid confusion, that it might be better to pass the trains over that night, with everything not essential to battle, and let his troops remain in position until the night of the 14th; that if the rest of his line was as strong as mine we could easily repulse any attack that might be made, and thus recover some of the prestige lost by the discomfiture at Gettysburg. After we crossed the Potomac we soon found that the Federals were pushing along the west side of the Blue Ridge with the purpose of cutting off our retreat to Richmond. General Lee again sent my corps forward to prevent this effort on the part of General Meade, and we succeeded in clearing the way, and holding it open for the Third corps that followed us. General Ewell, however, was cut off, and was obliged to pass the mountains further south. The First corps reached Culpeper Courthouse on the 24th.

In the month of August, 1863, while lying along the Rapidan, I called General Lee's attention to the condition of our affairs in the West, and the progress that was being made by the army under General Rosecranz, in cutting a new line through the State of Georgia, and suggesting that a successful march, such as he had started on would again bisect the Southern country, and that when that was done the war would be virtually over. I suggested that he should adhere to his defensive tactics upon the Rapidan, and reinforce from his army the army lying in front of Rosecranz—so that it could crush that army and then push on to the West. He seemed struck with these views, but was as much opposed to dividing his army as he was in the spring when I first suggested it. He went down to Richmond to arrange for another offensive campaign during the fall. While there several letters passed between us, only two of which I have preserved in connected form. The result of this correspondence was, however, that I was sent with two divisions—Hood's and McLaws'—to reinforce our army then in Georgia. The result of this movement was the defeat of Rosecranz at Chickamauga, when the last hope of the Confederacy expired with the failure of our army to prose-

cute the advantage gained by this defeat. The letters are appended herewith:

(Confidential.)

[Copy.]

"RICHMOND, August 31, 1863.

"Lieutenant-General J. LONGSTREET,

"Headquarters Army Northern Virginia:

"GENERAL: I have wished for several days past to return to the army, but have been detained by the President. He will not listen to my proposition to leave to-morrow.

"I hope you will use every exertion to prepare the army for offensive operations, and improve the condition of men and animals. I can see nothing better to be done than to endeavor to bring General Meade out and use our efforts to crush his army while in the present condition.

"The Quartermaster's Department promise to send up 3,000 bushels of corn per day, provided the cars can be unloaded and returned without delay. I hope you will be able to arrange it so that the cars will not be detained. With this supply of corn, if it can be maintained, the condition of our animals should improve.

"Very respectfully and truly yours,

(Signed)

"R. E. LEE, General."

[Copy.]

"HEADQUARTERS, September 2, 1863.

"GENERAL: Your letter of the 31st is received. I have expressed to Generals Ewell and Hill your wishes, and am doing all that can be done to be well-prepared with my own command. Our greatest difficulty will be in preparing our animals.

"I don't know that we can reasonably hope to accomplish much here by offensive operations, unless we are strong enough to cross the Potomac. If we advance to meet the enemy on this side he will in all probability go into one of his many fortified positions. These we cannot afford to attack.

"I know but little of the condition of our affairs in the West, but am inclined to the opinion that our best opportunity for great results is in Tennessee. If we could hold the defensive here with two corps and send the other to operate in Tennessee with that army, I think that we could accomplish more than by an advance from here.

"The enemy seems to have settled down upon the plan of holding certain points by fortifying and defending, while he concentrates upon others. It seems to me that this must succeed, unless we concentrate ourselves and at the same time make occasional show of active operations at all points.

"I know of no other means of acting upon that principle at present, except to depend upon our fortifications in Virginia, and concentrate with one corps of this army and such as may be drawn from others in Tennessee and destroy Rosecranz's army.

"I feel assured that this is practicable, and that greater advantages will be gained than by any operations from here.

"I remain, General, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

JAMES LONGSTREET, Lieut.-General.

"General R. E. LEE, Commanding, etc."

It will be noticed by those who have watched the desultory controversy maintained upon this subject, that after I had proved the fallacy of Gen. Pendleton's and General Early's idea of a sunrise attack, they fall back upon the charge that I delayed bringing my troops into action, waiving all question of an order from General Lee. I have shown that I did not receive orders from General Lee to attack until about 11 o'clock on the 2d; that I immediately began my dispositions for attack; that I waited about forty minutes for Laws' brigade, by General Lee's assenting authority; that by especial orders from General Lee my corps marched into position by a circuitous route, under the direction and conduct of Col. Johnson of his staff of engineers; that Colonel Johnson's orders were to keep the march of the troops concealed, and that I hurried Hood's division forward in the face of these orders, throwing them into line by a direct march, and breaking up the delay occasioned by the orders of Gen. Lee. I need only add that every movement or halt of the troops on that day was made in the immediate presence of General Lee, or in his sight—certainly within reach of his easy and prompt correction. I quote in this connection the order that I issued to the heads of departments in my corps on the 1st. I present the order issued to Colonel Walton of the artillery, similar orders having been issued to the division commanders:

[Order.]

"HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,  
"NEAR GETTYSBURG, July 18, 5:30 P. M.

"COLONEL: The Commanding-General desires you to come on to-night as fast as you can without distressing your men or animals. Hill and Ewell have sharply engaged the enemy and you will be needed for to-morrow's battle. Let us know where you will stop to-night. \* \* \* \* \*

"Respectfully,

"G. M. SORRELL, *A. A. General.*

"To Colonel J. B. WALTON, *Chief of Artillery.*"\*

I offer also a report made by General Hood touching this march. He says:

"While lying in camp near Chambersburg information was received that Hill and Ewell were about to come into contact with the enemy near Gettysburg. My troops, together with McLaws' division, were at once put in motion upon the most direct road to that point, which we reached after a hard march at or before sunrise on July the 2d. So imperative had been our orders to hasten forward with all possible speed that on the march my troops were allowed to halt and rest only about two hours during the night from the 1st to the 2d of July."

It appears to me that the gentlemen who made the above-mentioned charges against me have chosen the wrong point of attack. With their motives I have nothing to do; but I cannot help suggesting that if they had charged me with having precipitated the battle instead of having

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\*I am indebted to Colonel Walton for a copy of this order.

delayed it, the records might have sustained them in that my attack was made about four hours before General Ewell's. I am reminded in this connection of what a Federal officer, who was engaged in that battle, said to me when we were talking over the battle and the comments it had provoked. He said: "I cannot imagine how they can charge you with being late in your attack, as you were the only one that got in at all. I do not think their charge can be credited."

In conclusion I may say that it is unfortunate that the discussion of all mooted points concerning the battle was not opened before the death of General Lee. A word or two from him would have settled all points at issue. As it is, I have written an impartial narrative of the facts as they are, with such comments as the nature of the case seemed to demand.

The following appeared in the same issue of the *Times* which contained General Longstreet's paper:

**Some Additions to General Longstreet's Article, printed elsewhere.**

After the pages containing General Longstreet's article on the Gettysburg campaign had been stereotyped, two paragraphs were received from him which he desired to have added as foot notes to the text. As it was impossible to insert them in their proper place, they are given here. The first is a note to the passage which treats of Longstreet's arguments with Lee against making the attack on the morning of the 2d:

Now that the war is over, and we have the privilege of reviewing the conduct of both armies, we can see more clearly what would have been the effect of this proposed movement around the Federal left on the afternoon of the 1st. General Meade telegraphed to General Halleck in cipher just before my battle on the 2d: "If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster." If, therefore, we had drawn everything up on the night of the 1st and made a concentrated move on the morning of the 2d by our right flank, so as to seize the Emmetsburg road, we should either have been attacked or we should have dislodged General Meade from his position. The attack was of all things that which we most desired and had labored for. If, however, we had dislodged him from his position without his daring to strike a blow for his own soil—which is most probable, if not certain—the moral effect upon his army would have been appalling. The grandest feat that a general can hope to perform is to win a victory without striking a blow.

The next is a remark which should be added to the narrative at the point where General Longstreet argues against Colonel Taylor's assumption that he should have advanced Hood's and McLaws' divisions to the attack opened by Pickett, on the 3d:

A reading of the testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war (page 408) will show that General Meade fully anticipated my attack on the 3d, and was determined, if we moved our army in a direct column of assault, to attack it upon the flanks and destroy it. He told General Hancock upon the evening of the 3d that if we attacked him "he would throw the Fifth and Sixth Corps upon the enemy's flank." This determination was thwarted by the position of Hood's and McLaws' divisions, which were in line of battle before him. If I had moved them into the column of assault led by Pickett, as it is absurdly assumed by Colonel Taylor I was expected to do, the two threatening corps would have swept down upon our moving flank, with what effect any military man can easily divine.

The letter from General Longstreet, which accompanies these enclosures, dwells particularly upon a point which he wishes to have his readers understand as the justification of his present narrative. It is that while General Lee on the battle-field assumed all the responsibility for the result, he afterward published a report that differs from the report he made at the time while under that generous spirit. General Longstreet and other officers made their official reports upon the battle shortly after its occurrence, and while they were impressed with General Lee's noble assumption of all the blame; but General Lee having since written a detailed and somewhat critical account of the battle—and the account from which General Longstreet's critics get all their points against him—Longstreet feels himself justified in discussing the battle upon its merits. It is in recognition of his soldierly modesty that the substance of his letter is given here; the article is its own sufficient justification.

**Our Gettysburg Series.**

The origin of the series of papers on Gettysburg which we have published since August last, was the following letter of enquiry which we have recently received permission from its distinguished author to publish. We sent some twenty-five copies of this letter to leading Confederates who participated in the battle and were in position to know its inside history, selecting representatives of every corps and division of our army, and of every arm of the service. The replies received we forwarded to the Count of Paris, and have published in our papers without note or comment of our own.

Besides these we have published at different times the official reports of Generals R. E. Lee, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, J. E. B. Stuart, Rodes, R. H. Anderson, Brigadier-General J. B. Robertson, Colonel W. W. White, commanding Anderson's brigade, Brigadier-General H. L. Benning, Brigadier-General J. B. Kershaw, Colonel E. P. Alexander, and Brigadier-General J. H. Lane.

The reports of Generals Early, and Ewell had been previously published in the *Southern Magazine*, and the report of General W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, Army Northern Virginia, which is crowded out of this number, will be published hereafter.

These letters and official reports, and the other papers which we have published have made a series which has excited wide interest and attention, and called forth warm expressions as to their value and importance.

The Count of Paris says, in a recent letter concerning these papers: "I cannot say how valuable, how interesting for one who wishes to reach the truth, these letters are. As far as opinions go they do not always agree, and even where it is so, one may take a view different from those expressed by the writers; but they give, with a large number of unknown facts, a most interesting insight into the way in which the campaign, and especially the battle of Gettysburg was managed by General Lee and his subordinates."

It will be seen in the letter from our friend Major Scheibert, of the Prussian Royal Engineers, which we publish below, that he regards these papers as of the very highest interest and value.

We have thought proper to prefix these remarks to the letter which originated the series, which we now give in full as follows:

**Letter from the Count of Paris.**

SEVILLA, January 21st, 1877.

Rev. J. WM. JONES, D. D.,

*Secretary Southern Historical Society:*

DEAR SIR: I am writing the account of the battle of Gettysburg, and consider that chapter as the most important, the most difficult to write of the whole work which I have undertaken. I share the opinion of those who think that the Confederate cause was not a lost cause from the beginning; that it may have been successful; and therefore I seek with great care to find out why it did not succeed. The battle of Gettysburg, coupled with the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, is, in that respect, the turning point of the war.

The Army of Northern Virginia, when it invaded the Northern States was more powerful than it had ever been before. The issue of the invasion was disastrous for the Confederate cause. This is a mere fact which neither a Southerner nor a Northerner can dispute. Therefore, I must show the causes of this disaster without any disparagement for the army or its leader, just as I pointed out the causes of the ill successes of McClellan and Burnside, and shall do the same for Hooker.

At present, as far as my studies of this period go, my opinion on the question is this: The mistakes which brought upon the Confederate arms the repulse at Gettysburg with its fatal consequences were the following:

1st. It was a mistake to invade the Northern States at all, because it stirred up their military spirit. The best chance of the Confederacy was the pecuniary exhaustion of the North, and not the exhaustion of its resources in men. The invasion was the death-blow to what has been called the Copperhead party. It called under arms thousands of men who would never have enrolled otherwise, and who became experienced soldiers in '64, and, moreover, it diminished for one or two years the resisting powers of the Confederate army.

2d. If the invasion was to be undertaken, only raiding parties should have been sent until the Army of the Potomac should have been defeated. It was a great mistake to bring her on the



Northern soil, where they fought ten times better than in Virginia. A real invasion, viz: the establishment of the Confederate army in Pennsylvania, with its communications well secured, was an impossibility as long as the Federal army was not crushed. The proof is, that as soon as the latter began to move, Lee, who had undertaken nothing but a raid on a too large scale, found himself so much endangered that he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on the ground where Meade chose to wait for him. He ought to have manœuvred in Virginia so as to bring on a battle before crossing the Potomac.

3rd. The way in which the fights of the 2nd of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville.

4th. I do not understand why Lee, having gained some success on the 2nd, but found the Federal position very strong, did not attempt to turn it by the south, which was its weak place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington.

5th. The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett, on the 3rd, should never have been attempted. Longstreet seems to think that it was imposed upon him against his will by Lee. General Early says distinctly, in a paper published by the Southern Historical Society, that Longstreet deferred it so long that the Second corps could not co-operate with it as it would have done if the attack had taken place early in the morning. I hesitate very much between these two opinions.

I put these questions to you in a letter which I wish you to keep private, at least, not to publish; because, in my sincere desire to judge fairly the Confederate army, you may help me by putting the same questions to some of the Confederate leaders who are still alive, and with whom you are in correspondence. The opinion of General Early, for whom I have the greatest consideration as a soldier, would be especially valuable for me. Of course I do not pledge myself to accept wholly any one's opinion, but it would be of the greatest importance for me to know what Confederate officers think now of the causes of their repulse at Gettysburg.

Believe me, dear sir, yours truly,

L. P. D'ORLEANS, *Comte de Paris.*

[Address: Chateau d'Eu Seine-Inferieure, France.]

**Letter from Maj. Schelbert, of the Prussian Royal Engineers.**

[As the opinion of a distinguished foreigner who witnessed the battle of Gettysburg and has manifested the liveliest interest in the discussion concerning it, the following letter will have an interest for all of our readers; but for those who knew the gallant Prussian, and appreciated his warm sympathy for our struggling people, it will have a peculiar interest.]

STUTTGART, 21st Nov., '77.

Rev. J. WM. JONES,

*Sec'y S. H. Soc'y :*

DEAR SIR: You will, perhaps, be surprised that a foreigner should desire to mingle in the discussion of the battle of Gettysburg; but I have some reasons which urge me to give you *my* opinion about that affair. 1. I was an impartial observer; 2. I was, so far as I know, the only man on the Southern side who could see everything going on in that battle, having climbed into the top of a very tall tree near Gettysburg, which overlooked all the woody country. I had so good a view that Gen'l Lee himself came up to the tree twice to ask about the positions and movements of the enemy.

It was the same tree upon which Col. Freemantle sat (see Gen'l Hood's letter) until the opening of the battle, when (longing to see a fight, which he had never seen before,) he left his position.

The questions of the English author, whose name I do not know, lead me to suppose that either he is not a soldier or has never studied the war, and they remind me of the questions asked by the famous "Committee on the Conduct of the War," which made the officers of our army smile.

But the result of those poor questions is a splendid, rich, military harvest, which will most deeply interest every European soldier.

I cannot remember, notwithstanding my earnest studies in military history, one case where the history of a battle has been so fully illustrated and illuminated by individual reports given by all of the prominent leaders—not immediately after the battle, when personal impressions are conflicting, but after a lapse of more than ten years, when time and matured judgment have ripened the

fresh sketch into a splendid picture. The result is so impressive that if I were professor of military science, I would choose the battle of Gettysburg for the special study of my students. My personal impressions about the poor result of the battle of Gettysburg have been exactly expressed by Gen'l Heth, whose letter I fully endorse. But he, as well as the other writers, has omitted one element which seems to me to be of the highest importance. I refer to the individual character of Gen'l Lee. I have made the military character of this General, who has never had an admirer of such fervour as myself, my peculiar study, and have written a biographical sketch of him, which appeared in a German paper.

Lee was, in my opinion, one of the ablest leaders of this century in two great qualities. He weighed everything, even the smallest detail, in making his general plan of battle, and he made the boldest dispositions with heroic courage and the most stubborn energy. He gave to every link the right place in the construction of a chain which became a masterpiece of military workmanship.

He did not reach his conclusions, as Jackson and Stuart did, by an instinctive, sudden impulse; his plans did not come upon him like the lightning's flash followed by the thunder's crash: but he painfully and studiously labored in order to arrange those splendid dispositions fraught with the keenest and most hardy enterprises, and well worthy of the troops which were ordered to execute them.

General Lee, in speaking to me of his dispositions, said: "Captain, I do everything in my power to make my plans as perfect as possible, and to bring the troops upon the field of battle; the rest must be done by my generals and their troops, trusting to Providence for the victory."

Thus he would successfully oppose immense odds, as the result of his thorough preparation, so long as he was minutely advised of the whereabouts, strength, and intentions of the enemy. "The eyes" by which he saw these things, as my friend Colonel Taylor justly observes, was his cavalry, and without these he was groping unsafely in the dark night.

But in all these cases General Jackson (who had his special information coupled with his natural instincts, his sudden impulses, and his peculiar ideas,) came or was ordered to headquarters to

give his personal opinions to the Commanding-General, who linked the genial thoughts of Jackson to his own beautiful chain: *e. g.*, before the battle of Chancellorsville these famous leaders met on a hill near the Aldrich house to mature those plans which resulted in the unequalled battles of the Wilderness and Chancellorsville. Each of these generals was the supplement to the other; just as in the family, *both man and wife* are necessary to keep up the household.

When Jackson fell, Lee, as he himself said, lost his right arm, the army lost the mother, and thus the void which had been made was too great to be so soon closed, the wound which the army received too deep to be healed in four weeks. Thus the carefully-planning general encountered the fearful odds at Gettysburg without his faithful mirror, the cavalry, and without his ready counsellor, General Jackson. He himself felt this great loss in making his dispositions. He felt uneasy, as Hood justly remarks.

All who saw him on these two occasions, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, will remember that Lee at Chancellorsville (where I had the honor of being at his side in the brunt of the struggle), was full of calm, quiet, self-possession, feeling that he had done his duty to the utmost, and had brought the army into the most favorable position to defeat the hostile host. In the days at Gettysburg this quiet self-possessed calmness was wanting. Lee was not at his ease, but was riding to and fro, frequently changing his position, making anxious enquiries here and there, and looking care-worn. After the shock of battle was over he resumed his accustomed calmness, for then he saw clearly and handled the army with that masterly ability which was peculiar to him. This uneasiness during the days of the battle was contagious to the army, as will appear from the reports of Longstreet, Hood, Heth, and others, and as appeared also to me from the peep I had of the battle-field. What a difference from the systematic advance of the army from the Wilderness to the assault of the breastworks at Chancellorsville, where a unity of disposition and a feeling of security reigned in all the ranks. At Gettysburg there was cannonading without real effect, desultory efforts without combination, and lastly, the single attack which closed the drama, and which I, from my outlook in the top of the tree, believed to be only a reconnoissance in heavy force.

Want of confidence, misapprehensions, and mistakes were the consequences, less of Stuart's absence than of the absence of Jackson, whose place up to this time had not been filled.

After this it was filled by *Lee himself*, who, like a father when the mother dies, seeks to fill both her place and his own in the house. He doubled his fighting qualities, he made the most judicious use of his cavalry, and the result was splendid, for the campaign of 1864 to the closing scene at Appomattox was the most brilliant which Lee ever fought.

We European soldiers have only one wish, and that is that, like the battles of 1861 to 1863, the last campaign may find Southern authors and authorities to give special narratives and correct details of that famous series of battles, concerning which we are in comparative ignorance.

The battle of Gettysburg would have been won by Lee's army if it could have advanced at any time and on any part of the field to *one concentrated and combined attack* on the enemy's position. This is the impression I have received from my personal observation, and from the valuable details of your exceedingly interesting papers.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. SCHEIBERT.

## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

THE COMBINING OF OUR JANUARY AND FEBRUARY numbers enables us to give articles which have been already delayed longer than was desirable, while our readers lose nothing by the change, and gain an earlier reception of the matter for our February number.

RENEWALS AND NEW SUBSCRIBERS are now in order, and we beg our friends to let us have both as rapidly as possible. If you hear an old subscriber complaining that he has not received his *January* number, please ask him, with our compliments, if he has sent on his *renewal fee*! We do not send this number to those whose time has expired and from whom we have not heard; and let each one of our friends try to send us at least one new subscriber.

MISTAKES BY OUR PRINTER are not frequent, but our last number contained some which were as annoying to him as to the writer and the editor. In the two papers by General Early on the Battle of Gettysburg there were a number of errors, the most important of which we correct, as follows: Page 243, line 10, for "round" read "moved"; page 246, line 16, for "above" read "alone"; page 248, line 19, for "Brownboro'" read "Boonsboro'"; page 259, line 23, for "our" read "one"; page 259, line 4 from bottom, for "force" before "strongly" read "part"; page 272, line 4, for "northwest" read "southwest"; page 273, line 15, for "argued" read "agreed"; page 281, line 5 of note, for "Jenlac" read "Senlac"; page 288, line 18, for "morning" read "evening"; page 291, line 24, for "sabre-hilt" read "sabre-belt"; page 299, line 29, for "Gracy's" read "Geary's"; page 300, line 4 of note, for "2nd" read "3rd"; page 301, line 4 from bottom of note, for "our" read "one"; page 279, line 10, the date "18th of September" should be the "19th of September," the error being in the manuscript. There are a number of verbal errors, as the substitution of "in" for "on," and of "these" for "those."

OUR LIBERAL BENEFACTOR, W. W. CORCORAN, Esq., of Washington, has placed the Society under renewed obligations by another donation of

\$500. Of princely liberality, Mr. Corcoran is at the same time *judicious* in his donations, and it adds to the pleasure of this gift to receive it as a token of his continued interest in the work we are doing and his confidence in the management of our affairs.

### Book Notices.

THE NARRATIVE OF A BLOCKADE-RUNNER, by Capt. J. Wilkinson, C. S. Navy. New York: Sheldon & Co.

We had the privilege of reading this book in the MS. of its gallant author, and have read it again with the liveliest interest in the handsome form in which Sheldon & Co. have brought it out.

The first three chapters of the book contain an exceedingly interesting narrative of the secession of Virginia, naval service on the Potomac and on the lower Mississippi, and of the events which preceded the fall of New Orleans.

In his fourth chapter he gives an account of his prison experience, discusses somewhat the "prison question," and does us the honor to quote the *summing up* of the discussion of this question in our *Papers*.

The remaining chapters of the book tell the thrilling story of his adventures as a blockade-runner, and give incidents of deep interest and great historic value.

Captain Wilkinson made twenty-one successful trips in the "Lee," and then commanded most successfully the "Whisper," the "Chickamauga," and the "Chameleon."

The narrative is admirably written, and, although the modesty of the author keeps himself in the background, it is easy to see that Capt. Wilkinson was one of the most gallant and skilful of that noble body of old naval officers who gave up lucrative and pleasant places in the United States service and cheerfully sacrificed their all for the cause of constitutional freedom.

He has produced a book of rare interest, which should have a place in every library and be widely read by our people.

It is sufficient to say of the general *get-up* of the book that it is in the best style of those masters of the art of book-making, Sheldon & Co., New York.

FOUR YEARS WITH GENERAL LEE, by Colonel Walter H. Taylor, of his staff, is a book which must have the widest circulation, and go down to posterity as of highest authority on the points of which it treats.



From the time that General Lee took command of the Virginia forces in '61 to the surrender at Appomattox, Colonel Taylor served on his staff, and was one of his most trusted officers. For a large part of this period he occupied the position of Adjutant-General of the Army of Northern Virginia, and no man in that army was more widely known or more universally esteemed for high personal character, or for the intelligent zeal and rare ability and tact with which he discharged his delicate and responsible duties.

With such opportunities for knowing the *inside* history of our grand old army, we expected Colonel Taylor to give us a book of great historic value, and we have not been disappointed. We have read it twice with increasing interest, and have placed it on a convenient shelf for frequent consultation. There will be, of course, differences of opinion in reference to certain of his statements and opinions; but no one who knows Colonel Taylor can doubt for a moment that he has carefully, and conscientiously endeavored to "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" concerning the great events of which he writes.

He gives a number of hitherto unpublished incidents which illustrate the character of General Lee and make us wish that his narrative had been fuller in this respect, and he brings out invaluable material for a correct understanding of the campaigns of his great chief.

But a main object of his book was to determine the relative numbers of the Confederate and Federal armies in all of the principal battles, and this he has certainly *settled* beyond all dispute.

By some means (*how* we are not told) Colonel Taylor was so fortunate as to obtain access to the field returns of the Army of Northern Virginia, now in the "Archive Bureau" at Washington, and to verify his memoranda of our numbers; and thus he is enabled to show (taking the Federal official reports of their numbers) the fearful odds against which we always fought.

We propose to give his figures in a future number. We have only space now to add that the style of the author is simple, clear, direct, and admirably suited to his subject. The fact that the book is published by D. Appleton & Co., New York, is sufficient guarantee that in paper, type, binding, &c., it is all that could be desired.

We only regret that the publishers have put in as frontispiece a very poor likeness of General Lee, instead of a very fine one which they have used in others of their publications.

We conclude with the hope that this book will meet with such general favor as to induce the accomplished author to write a *full* history of the campaigns of the Army of Northern Virginia.